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SUMMARY
The 13th Amendment ban on involuntary servitude has new relevance as the U.S. grapples
with national emergencies such as catastrophic hurricanes, flu pandemics, and terrorism. This
Article considers work refusal and coerced work performance in life-threatening employment
contexts. Overwhelmed by fear, hundreds of police officers and health care workers abandoned
their jobs during Hurricane Katrina. Postal clerks worked against their will without masks in
facilities with anthrax. A report by Congress worries that avian flu will cause sick and frightened
medical personnel to stay away from work, thus jeopardizing a coherent response to a crisis.
How far can the U.S. go in forcing reluctant civilians to perform essential jobs during a
national emergency? I explore solutions to this question by hypothesizing a large release of
radiation— whether by terror attack, or catastrophic accident, or major earthquake— in a vital
Pacific port. These ports have a history of work stoppages that disrupt the nation’s economy. I
examine federal government responses if dock workers refused assignments until conditions were
safe: (1) The President could declare a national emergency labor dispute under the Taft-Hartley
Act, and seek an 80-day back-to-work injunction. (2) Congress could re-enact Section 8 of the War
Labor Disputes Act, making it unlawful for dock workers to discontinue production for 30 days
and subjecting violators to coercive damages. (3) The president could issue strong executive
orders, backed by imprisonment, that regulate employment in ports.
At the heart of my analysis, I ask: Would any of these responses violate the Thirteenth
Amendment ban on involuntary servitude? Congress and the judiciary have broadened this law,
and its enforcement counterpart in 18 U.S.C. § 1584, beyond the abolition of African slaveholding. The Supreme Court in Kozminski defined involuntary servitude as forcing a person to
work by physical or legal coercion.
But the Supreme Court created 13th Amendment exceptions for transportation work.
Robertson upholds a law that bars merchant seamen from quitting work, and imprisons deserters.
Butler permits states to conscript citizens to work on highways, on pain of imprisonment. Dock
work is similar because ports integrate ships and trucks in a transportation hub. Courts now apply
these precedents to new compulsory activities, such as mandatory public service for graduation.
Moreover, Kozminski reaffirmed Robertson and Butler as precedents.
Thus, the Constitution would be unlikely to shield dock workers from involuntary labor.
This has troubling implications for employees who have recently worked in national emergencies,
and may do so again. Employees who work to alleviate avian flu or other catastrophic health
threats are also at risk for compulsory labor that exposes them to extraordinary hazards.
I conclude with a legislative proposal to strengthen individual rights. As my research
shows, courts that are presented with national emergency disputes rarely side with the individual
who stands in the way of the public’s welfare. Without a more balanced labor policy to address
emerging crises, the nation may realize belatedly “that when we allow fundamental freedoms to be
sacrificed in the name of real or perceived emergency, we invariably come to regret it.”1
1

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (J. Brennan, dissenting).
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Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
2
subject to their jurisdiction.

I. INTRODUCTION
A. How Far Can The U.S. Go In Forcing Reluctant Civilians
To Perform Essential Jobs In A National Emergency?
Our nation has recently experienced national emergencies. Some were manmade— for example, 9/11 and the anthrax attacks of 2001— while another, Hurricane
Katrina, was a natural disaster. Others are chilling possibilities, such as an avian flu
pandemic. Whether past or potential, man-made or natural, each emergency enlarges
government power at the expense of individual liberties.
Our society’s need for order and security, balanced by a constitutional tradition
that values individual liberty, sets the stage for my research question. I re-contextualize
these fundamental interests in a novel, though important setting: the civilian workplace in
an extreme catastrophe, disaster, or attack that frightens employees to the point of
refusing to work. Suppose that these workers perform a public service that is so vital that
their duties cannot be interrupted, not even briefly.
My Article asks: Can the government force these civilians to work against their
will? Would a compulsory work law violate the 13th Amendment ban on involuntary
servitude? While work refusal in national emergencies is extremely rare, we have
witnessed it on TV, simulated it in disaster drills, and learned about it in congressional
hearings. At the height of Katrina’s anarchy, 200 New Orleans police officers abandoned
their jobs while on duty.3 Health care workers, fearful of drowning in the rising torrent,

2

Amendment XIII, Section 1. Section 2 of the Amendment states: “Congress shall have the power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” In this vein, see 18 U.S.C. § 1584, infra note 139.
3
Timothy Appleby, Storm’s Victims Still Seek Blame As Katrina’s Toll Grows Higher, GLOBE &
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abandoned nursing home patients and residents.4 The future portends similar forms of
worker flight. Just months before 9/11, Dark Winter simulated a smallpox attack in the
U.S.5 In the exercise, many unvaccinated emergency room personnel failed to show up
for work after a smallpox outbreak was reported.6 More recently, a report by Congress on
avian flu said that ill and frightened medical personnel would stay away from work,
jeopardizing a coherent response to a national crisis.7
My Article hypothesizes that a natural disaster, catastrophic accident, or attack
will pose a national emergency, but a sizeable number of workers will abandon their
jobs— or refuse work orders— during this crisis. Their flight will harm the nation’s
economy. I suggest that Congress and the president would take swift and decisive action
to compel workers to stay on the job. But workers would continue to resist orders to
return to their jobs. At that critical moment, how far could the government push these
essential workers without violating a constitutional ban on involuntary servitude?
B. The Setting for this Analysis: Radiation Exposure at a Pacific Port
I explore solutions to the foregoing question by hypothesizing a large release of
radiation in a vital Pacific port. Because they are key transportation hubs, ports are also
choke points in the U.S. economy. The Los Angeles and Long Beach ports handle 60% of
MAIL (Toronto Can.), Sept. 5, 2006, at A8 (more than 200 of New Orleans’ 1,500 police officers
abandoned their jobs in response to extraordinary stress and personal risks).
4
Also see Robert Davis & Kevin Johnson, Hospital Workers Subpoenaed in Post-Katrina Deaths,
USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2005), at 01A (investigators are reviewing whether patients and residents at nearly
two dozen facilities were abandoned).
5
JOHNS HOPKINS CENTER FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE, ET AL., DARK WINTER (June 22-23, 2001),
available at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/DARK%20WINTER.pdf.
6
Id. at 24, stating: “many hospital employees are not showing up for work for fear of contagion.”
During the exercise the Director of FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) worried that “most
U.S. hospitals don’t have the staff to care for extra patients even in normal times. Now, with so many
hospital workers afraid to come to work, staff shortages are even worse, making it impossible for NDMS
(National Disaster Medical System) hospitals to accept patients (emphasis added).” Id. at 33.
7
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A POTENTIAL INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: POSSIBLE
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY ISSUES (December 8, 2005), at 9.
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the nation’s imports from Asia.8 Recently enacted port legislation reflects the realism of
this hypothetical scenario.9
I suppose that dock workers would stop working until the radiation hazard
subsided. Experts advise that radioactive exposure from a dirty bomb would not pose a
direct threat to human life— fear would outweigh any tangible harm.10 A radiation
exposure event need not be large to wreak economic havoc. This implicates federal labor
policy. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) broadly grants employees a right to
strike,11 while an NLRA amendment grants protection to individuals who quit working
when they are exposed to abnormal dangers.12 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
narrowly interpreted the meaning of abnormally dangerous conditions of work, thus

8

Daniel Machalaba, Tiny British Columbia Port Aims to Be New Venue for China Trade, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2006), at A1.
9
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act, P.L. 108-293, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., H.R. Conf.
Rep. 108-617, July 20, 2004, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 936, 2004 WL 1640167 (Leg.Hist.). In Section 805,
Congress has directed the Coast Guard to “conduct a vulnerability assessment . . . of the waters under the
jurisdiction of the United States that are adjacent to nuclear facilities that may be damaged by a
transportation security incident.” Id. at Section 805(1). Section 808 directs the Secretary of Transportation
to “conduct investigations, fund pilot programs, and award grants . . . to detect accurately nuclear or
radiological materials.” Id. at Section 808(a)(i)(1)(C) (investigations). In addition, this section orders the
Secretary to improve tags and seals on shipping containers to track the transportation of the merchandise in
these enclosed spaces, “including sensors that are able to track a container throughout its entire supply
chain, detect hazardous and radioactive materials within that container, and transmit that information to the
appropriate law enforcement authorities.” Id. at Section 808(a)(i)(1)(D) (investigations).
10
Dr. Philip Anderson, Center for Strategic and International Studies, RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL
DEVICES: THE DIRTY BOMB CHALLENGE (hereafter, RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES), available at
http://csis.org/isp/homeland_rdd.pdf. In this report, CSIS stated that it “assembled a team of security
professionals to develop a realistic crisis scenario and planning exercise” based on “a credible scenario of a
terrorist attack involving a ‘dirty bomb’ on downtown Washington, D.C.” Id. at 4. In “most cases the
radiation will not cause any casualties,” but the CSIS Report observed that the psychological impact of
such an attack would be enormous “[d]ue to the public’s inherent fear of radiation.” Id. at 3.
11
National Labor Relations Act, § 13, 49 Stat at 457, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 163
(2004), stating: “Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as
either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or
qualifications on that right.”
12
Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 502, 61 Stat.
136, 141-42, reprinted in 1 LAB. MGMT. RELATIONS ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY [hereinafter, LMRA LEG.
HIST.]. The law is commonly called the Taft-Hartley Act in recognition of its principal architects, Sen.
Robert Taft and Rep. Fred Hartley.
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limiting this privilege.13 Also, Congress has authorized federal courts to enjoin work
stoppages that harm the nation’s welfare.14
Briefly, I address the rationale for inventing this constitutional labor crisis.
Traditional legal scholarship looks back in time by focusing on a critical development—
a court ruling, a new law or regulation, an emerging trend. Although my approach departs
from this practice, it simply adds to an emerging genre of simulated constitutional crises.
Scholars are plowing this furrow,15 but not because they are fiction writers. They believe
that “constitutional thought has no choice but to develop through its own distinctive
rhythms. Now is the moment to toss the ball onto the field of legal speculation and invite
others to play the game.”16
C. Overview
Part II researches policy options to the hypothetical port work stoppage.17 Table 1
summarizes these policy dimensions: (a) feasibility, (b) duration of a compulsory work
order, and (c) government coercion of individual workers. Part II.A explores an existing
policy response, a Taft-Hartley injunction that would last the statutory maximum of 80

13

See Gateway Coal, infra notes 57 - 60, and related text.
See infra notes 38 - 40, and related text.
15
E.g., Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV L. REV.
2673, (2005) (hypothesizing a mass detention of Arab-American males in a New York metropolitan sports
arena). Other futuristic paradigms appear in Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United
States, 49 A.F.L. REV. 67, 111 (2000) (using a popular movie, The Siege, as a hypothetical that posits
aerosol release of smallpox by terrorists in busy airports); Mitchell Gordon, Adjusting the Rear-View
Mirror: Rethinking the Use of History in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 475, 485 (2006)
(distinguishing between forensic history and deliberative history, in which the latter views “history not as
an authoritative oracle but as a source of relevant human experience, one that present-day decision-makers
can use as a resource to help choose a future course”); and ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM
WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 158-63 (2002) (discussing a
proposal for sanctioned torture based on a set of hypothetical assumptions).
16
Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1091 (2004).
17
Infra notes 36 – 125.
14
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days.18 This section includes analysis of the workers’ claim that their walkout is
privileged under Section 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act due to abnormally dangerous work
conditions.19 Part II.B examines a dormant but once effective policy for keeping workers
on the job during a national crisis— Section 8 of the War Labor Disputes Act (WLDA), a
law that prohibited workers from discontinuing production for 30 days.20 Part III.C
surveys executive orders that could be used as future models to compel dock workers to
return to their jobs for 30 more days a Taft-Hartley injunction expires.21
My focus shifts in Part III to the Thirteenth Amendment and its evolution since it
outlawed slavery.22 Part III.A traces the Amendment’s expansion to its present point of
prohibiting labor that results from physical or legal coercion23 — though notably, this
seemingly expansive doctrine has been narrowed by the Supreme Court.24 Furthermore,
as Part III.B shows,25 the Amendment has been significantly limited by judicial embrace
of the ancient doctrine, trinoda necessitis, a principle that compels individuals to perform
public service. Part III.C examines the maritime duty exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment that has been applied to anchored ships in U.S. ports.26
Part IV is the heart of my analysis, and explores whether the Thirteenth
Amendment would prevent the government from ordering dock workers back on the job
at a radioactive port.27 A court would likely rule that the Amendment does not bar
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Infra notes 36 - 69.
Infra notes 52 - 64.
Infra notes 70 - 92.
Infra notes 92 - 125.
Infra notes 126 - 205.
Infra notes 126 - 176.
Infra notes 164 - 176.
Infra notes 177 - 193.
Infra notes 194 - 205.
Infra notes 206 - 227.
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compulsion of dock work for up to 110 days,28 but I also consider grounds for a court
ruling that construes the Amendment so as to bar these mandatory orders.29
Part V extrapolates from the foregoing analysis by considering a spectrum of
national emergency threats that could engender a crippling work stoppage.30 Table 3
organizes this discussion by providing a template of the legal landscape for national
emergencies that have already affected, or are predicted to affect, key occupations (in
9/11, fire fighters, police, utility technicians, construction tradesmen, and sanitation
workers; in Hurricane Katrina, police and health care workers; in anthrax attacks, postal
workers; and in case of avian flu or other catastrophic health threat, pharmaceutical
factory workers, physicians, and nurses).
Conclusion No. 1 finds that a Taft-Hartley injunction would be the most potent
back-to-work policy for essential private sector jobs performed in pharmaceutical plants,
and basic infrastructure such as telecommunications, gas, and electric.31 Conclusion No.
2 notes, however, that this type of injunction is not available for key public sector
occupations such fire fighters, police, and public health care workers— a fact that could
complicate a federal response to a national emergency work stoppage.32 Conclusion No. 3
postulates that the strength of employee protection under the 13th Amendment depends on
two factors that vary by national emergency— the scope of trinoda necessitas as it bears
on specific types of work, and the imminent threat to an individual’s life by working
amid extreme danger.33 Thus, while a court would likely order dock workers back on the
28
29
30
31
32
33

Infra notes 206 - 214.
Infra notes 215 – 227.
Infra notes 228 – 254.
Infra notes 236 - 237.
Infra notes 238 - 241.
Infra notes 242 - 249.
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job, the same court would be unlikely to compel flu-stricken pharmaceutical workers
back to a manufacturing plant, even during a deadly pandemic when medical supplies are
scarce.34 Conclusion No. 4 suggests that more balance is needed in these crises to weigh
individual safety interests, and proposes a limit on Taft-Hartley injunctions.35
II. A VITAL PACIFIC PORT IS CRIPPLED BY RADIATION EXPOSURE:
THE COURTS, CONGRESS, AND PRESIDENT RESPOND
Suppose that a vital Pacific port has a radiation release and dock workers refuse to
do their jobs until the hazard is mitigated. Table 1 summarizes federal policy response
options: (a) a Taft-Hartley injunction to order workers back to their jobs in this national
emergency, (b) a War Labor Disputes Act ban on discontinuing work, and (c) executive
orders that compel work performance.
Here in Part II, I explain how these government actions return employees
involuntarily back to their work, and evaluate these actions by asking: (1) How feasible
are these orders? (2) How long do the orders compel work by private employees? (3)
How does the government enforce these orders by pressuring individual employees?
My answers are summarized in Table 1. Figure 1 appears immediately after this
table, and closely examines the kind of pressure that the U.S. has applied in similar
national emergencies involving workers. This information provides a critical link to my
Thirteenth Amendment analysis in Part IV. Currently, the test for involuntary servitude is
whether individuals are “forced to work . . . by the use or threat of physical restraint or
physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process.”36
This legal standard is important to bear in mind because each government action aims to
34

See main text that is associated with infra note 244.
Infra notes 250 - 254.
36
Kozminski, infra note 144, at 952.
35
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return employees involuntarily to their work. The issue is whether these actions reach the
legal threshold of coercion.
A. The First 80 Days of a National Emergency Work Dispute:
Injunction under the Taft-Hartley Act
Ports could not close for long without hurting the U.S. economy.37 The President
is empowered to order workers back on the job by declaring a national emergency under
the Taft-Hartley Act when a threatened or actual work stoppage “imperil(s) the national
health or safety.”38 The Attorney General may petition a federal court for an injunction to
halt this job action.39 The law specifies conditions for courts to issue this emergency
order.40 As Table 1 reflects, this policy response is highly feasible.

37

A quarter of the nation’s container cargo is handled by the ports of Los Angeles and Long
Beach, and an estimated 400,000 people in Southern California are directly employed in the region’s
international trade sector. See Larry Kanter, Devastating Strike Feared, LOS ANGELES BUS. J. (Dec. 7,
1998), at 1.
38
Labor-Management Relations Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 176, LMRA LEG. HIST. at supra note
11 (authorizing the President to appoint a Board of Inquiry to determine if a work stoppage imperils the
national health or safety, and further authorizing release of the fact findings to the public).
39
Id. at 29 U.S.C. § 178.
40
Id., authorizing a court to issue an injunction if it finds that a threatened or actual work
stoppage:
(i) affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in trade, commerce,
transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or with foreign
nations, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce; and
(ii) if permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the national health or safety, it shall
have jurisdiction to enjoin any such strike or lockout, or the continuing thereof, and to
make such other orders as may be appropriate.
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Table 1
Federal Authority to Compel Port Workers to Stay on the Job
in a National Emergency
Authority

Feasibility of
Government
Response

Length of
Compulsory
Work

Government
Coercion of
Individual to Work

Taft-Hartley Injunction

High

80 Days

Injunction and
Contempt Powers

War Labor Disputes Act
(WLDA), § 8

Moderate to
High

30 Days

Damages Assessed
Against Individual
Employees

Zero

Undetermined

Undetermined

Low

Undetermined

Undetermined

Low to
Moderate

No Specific
Duration

Up to 10 Years
Imprisonment,
and $10,000 Fine—
Expressly Limited
to Merchant Seamen

Executive Order
• Unilaterally Seize Port
Modeled After Executive
Order 9728

• Order Workers Back on
the Job Pursuant to
FPASA Act of 1949
Modeled After Executive
Order 13202

• Order Coast Guard to
Control Port Pursuant
to 50 U.S.C. § 191, and
Issue Employment
Regulations for
Merchant Marine and
Employees at
“Waterfront Facilities”
Modeled After Executive
Order 10173
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Figure 1: Coercive Actions Against Labor Unions and Union Members in
Work Stoppages That Cause Public Disorder and Economic Injury
The War Labor Disputes Act,
50 U.S.C. App. § 1501, in
France Packing Co. v. Dailey,
166 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1948).

U.S. v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 330
U.S. 258 (1947)

Monetary Damages
to U.S. for Failure to
Continue Production

Imprisonment for 10
Years and Fine Up to
$10,000

Coercive Civil
Contempt: Fines or
Jail

Section 8(a)(2) limited the
right to strike in these
terms: “For not less than
thirty days after any notice
under paragraph (1) is
given, the [employer] and
his employees shall
continue production under
all the conditions which
prevailed when such
dispute arose (emphasis
added). . . .” Section 8(c)
made a work stoppage
extremely costly to
individuals— in contrast to
holding unions responsible
for these actions— when it
said: “Any person who is
under a duty to perform any
act required under
subsection (a) and who
willfully fails or refuses to
perform such act shall be
liable for damages resulting
from such failure or refusal
to any person injured
thereby and to the United
States if so injured.”

§ 6.18-1: If any . . . member
of the crew of any such
vessel fails to comply with
any regulation or rule issued
or order given under the
provisions of this title . . .
shall be subject to seizure
and forfeiture to the United
States in the same manner as
merchandise is forfeited for
violation of the customs
revenue laws; and the person
guilty of such failure,
obstruction, or interference
shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more
than ten years and may, in
the discretion of the court, be
fined not more than $10,000.

Federal court fined union
$10 million, and president
$10,000, for defying nostrike injunction to end a
national emergency. The
Supreme Court ruled that the
penalties were civil:
“Judicial sanctions in civil
contempt proceedings may
. . . be employed for either
or both of two purposes; to
coerce the defendant into
compliance with the court’s
order, and to compensate the
complainant for losses
sustained. Where
compensation is intended, a
fine is imposed, payable to
the complainant. Such fine
must of course be based
upon evidence of
complainant’s actual loss,
and his right, as a civil
litigant, to the compensatory
fine is dependent upon the
outcome of the basic
controversy.” The fines were
upheld.

Regulations Relating To the
Safeguarding of Vessels, Harbors, Ports,
and Waterfront Facilities of the United
States, 50 U.S.C. § c. 191, in Executive
Order 10173 (President Truman, 1950)

Coercive Criminal
Contempt: Fines or Jail
State court fined union $52
million, payable to Virginia
counties, for violating injunction
to curb public disorder and
economic injury resulting from
large strike in 1989. The
Supreme Court ruled that the
penalty was criminal in nature,
and thus required a jury trial: “a
fixed sentence of imprisonment
is punitive and criminal if it is
imposed retrospectively for a
completed act of disobedience
. . . such that the contemnor
cannot avoid or abbreviate the
confinement through later
compliance.” The fine was
vacated because it was levied
without a jury.

Int’l Union, United Mine
Workers of Am. v.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821
(1994)
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In previous port disputes,41 presidents sought Taft-Hartley injunctions. Federal
judges routinely granted these motions, and ordered dockworkers back on the job.42 This
experience was repeated in 2002, when Pacific port workers engaged in a slowdown to
protest unsafe working conditions.43 They were represented by the International
Longshore Workers Union (ILWU),44 a spirited union with a tradition of solidarity.45
Employer-members of the Pacific Maritime Association locked out workers and closed
all West Coast ports after repeatedly warning the ILWU to end its safety slowdown
tactics.46 Invoking emergency powers under the Taft-Hartley Act, President Bush won a
back-to-work order from a federal court.47
The track record of Taft-Hartley injunctions makes future use of this power highly
feasible. But this history is based on economic disputes. Already, the ILWU has stated its

41

See Executive Order 9964; Executive Order 9987; Executive Order 10490; Executive Order
10689; Executive Order 10842; Executive Order 10949; Executive Order 11013; Executive Order 11329;
Executive Order 11431; Executive Order 11621; and Exec. Order 13275.
42
See U.S. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 78 F.Supp. 710 (N.D.Cal. 1948); U.S. v. National
Maritime Union, 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 2275 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1948); U.S. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s
Ass’n, 116 F.Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); U.S. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 177 F.Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); U.S. v. Nat’l Maritime Union, 196 F.Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); U.S. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s
Ass’n, 293 F.Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); and U.S. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 337 F.Supp. 381
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). Also See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONAL EMERGENCY DISPUTES UNDER THE TAFTHARTLEY ACT, 1947-1977, Report 542 (1978), App. A at 5, summarizing 32 occasions, from 1947-1978,
when a president used this power.
43
See George Raine, Ports Accuse Dockworkers of Slowdown, Union Blames Productivity
Dropoff on Safety Concerns, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 12, 2002), A3. But ILWU President James Spinosa replied
that “in an 18-month time span during 2001-2002 we lost six of our brothers to fatal industrial accidents, by
far the worse period in West Coast safety in recent history.” Safety is Job One, THE DISPATCHER (Oct. 5,
2005), Vol. 63, No. 7, at 2.
44
See ILWU Longshore Division, at http://www.ilwu.org/longshore/index.cfm.
45
See The ILWU Story, Origins, http://www.ilwu.org/history/ilwu-story/ilwu-story.cfm.
Explaining its history, the ILWU notes that members have come “to understand the wisdom of the
principles of worker unity, internal democracy, and international solidarity advocated by members of the
militant Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)— principles summed up in the famous IWW slogan that
the new union would adopt, ‘An injury to one is an injury to all.’” Id.
46
Karen Gaudette, Dockworkers Expected Back Tonight, AKRON BEACON J. (Oct. 9, 2002), at D1.
47
Carolyn Lochhead, et al., Bush Gets Court to Reopen Ports, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 9, 2002), at A1.
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concerns about unsafe work conditions,48 and more recently, port attacks.49 A Section
502 walkout spurred by radiation exposure would have a different complexion than
earlier Taft-Hartley disputes. This would present a court with an issue of first impression.
The ILWU would likely ask a court to apply Section 502 of the same law that
provides injunctions for national emergency work interruptions. This section creates a
countervailing worker right— a privilege for “the quitting of labor” when employees
encounter “abnormally dangerous conditions for work.”50 This law is a paradox because
Section 502 was part of sweeping legislation— called the Labor-Management Relations
Act (also called the Taft-Hartley Act)— that limited work stoppages.51 Section 502
protects a walkout that seems like a strike, but categorizes a work stoppage for
compelling safety reasons as something other than a strike.52 The Republican sponsor of
the bill proposed this distinction believing that “it would be very unfair and very unjust to

48

Safety Is Job One, in supra note 43 reporting: “what you see is an impressive collection of
giant, fast-moving machinery—cranes, straddle carriers, top handlers, side handlers and yard hustlers, each
weighing many tons and all racing to get the job done. With those massive objects running at that speed, a
simple slip of sequence can be catastrophic.” He added: “General Safety Training is offered to all ILWU
workers, but only once every three years. In other industries workers undergo safety training annually, and
in some cases, even monthly.”
49
An accidental explosion of butane gas containers in a truck trailer parked at the Port of Los
Angeles on April 28, 2004 raised serious concerns about readiness for an assault. Moreover, on March 14,
2004, armed extremists were shipped in a container to the Israeli port of Ashdod, and killed 10 dock
workers. These port security concerns are detailed in the testimony of Michael Mitre, ILWU Director of
Security, in U.S. Representative Frank Lobiondo (R-NJ) Holds A Hearing on Maritime Transportation
Security (June 9, 2004), at 2004 WL 1283418 (F.D.C.H.).
50
Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 12.
51
For example, § 8(b)(4)(A)-(C) was enacted to prohibit a union that has no labor dispute from
helping another union with a labor dispute by joining in various forms of secondary boycotts. LaborManagement Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 8(b)(4)(A)-(C), 61 Stat. 136, 141-42,
in 1 LMRA Leg. Hist., id., at 7. This provision diminished union power by reducing the amount of
economic pressure they could exert against employers. Id.
52
The complete statement of Section 502 makes this clear:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require an individual employee to render
labor or service without his consent . . . nor shall the quitting of labor by an employee or
employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the
place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a strike under this
chapter.
Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 12.
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employees in any industry to penalize them, if, because of abnormal or unusually
dangerous conditions, they should refrain from working.”53
While Section 502 appears to block a Taft-Hartley injunction, a court would
likely issue the national emergency restraining order. Case law under Section 502 is
limited,54 but so far has been mostly unfavorable to workers.55 A key problem for
employees is that courts tend to require objective, factual proof of abnormal danger to
justify a Section 502 walkout.56
This standard has led courts to rule against unions even when workers were
subjected to unusual hazards and risks. Consider coal miners who walked off the job after
air passages to their underground mine were obstructed and managers concealed the

53

Speaking on the Senate floor on May 26, 1946, Sen. Revercomb explained:
I know that the Senate and the Congress of the United States do not want to put men
under an obligation to work in an abnormally dangerous place. Of course there are
classes of employment in connection with which there are innate dangers, such as bridge
building, structural steel work, and coal mining, where an unusual condition of danger
other than a normal condition of danger exists. Mr. President, no man should be required
to go there, and if all of them stop work they should not be penalized for such stoppage. It
is to meet that situation that the language was written into the amendment.
92 Cong. Rec. 5687 (May 25, 1946) (copy on file with the author).
54
The cases, starting with the most recent, include: TNS v. N.L.R.B., 296 F.3d 384 (6th Cir.
2002); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cunningham, 269 N.L.R.B. 881 (1984); Daniel Constr. Co. v.
Edwards, 264 N.L.R.B. 770 (1982); Baker Marine Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 258 N.L.R.B. 680
(1981); Long-Airdox Co. v. Int’l Union United Auto Workers, 622 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1980); Cedar Coal Co.
v. United Mine Workers of Am., 560 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1977); Roadway Express, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 278
(1975); Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975);
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Banyard v. N.L.R.B., 505
F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Anaconda Aluminum Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 336 (1972); Machaby v. N.L.R.B., 377
F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1967); Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 330 F.2d 492 (3d Cir. 1964);
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961); and N.L.R.B. v. Knight-Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753
(6th Cir. 1957).
55
See Goodyear Tire & Rubber, id. at 881 (observing that “[i]t is well settled that Section 502
applies only where it has been objectively established that the working conditions are abnormally
dangerous”); Daniel Constr. Co. v. Edwards, id. at 770 (affirming that an employee’s refusal to work in a
radiation area was not protected under Section 502 because evidence established that radiation exposure
was not unsafe); Redwing Carriers, Inc., id. at 1209 (“What controls is not the state of mind of the
employee . . . concerned, but whether the actual working conditions shown to exist by competent evidence
might in the circumstances reasonably be considered ‘abnormally dangerous.’”).
56
See NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 1964) (holding that
employees may be discharged for stopping work because of dangerous conditions if “proof later of the
physical facts fail to support their prior belief”).
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problem. This occurred in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America,57 the
Supreme Court’s only Section 502 case. Although the Court did not rule directly on the
standard for abnormally dangerous work conditions, it strongly suggested adoption of an
objective test.58 Considering the simulation for Washington D.C. that caused great fear
but little or no physical harm,59 the dictum in Gateway Coal means that worker
perceptions of abnormal risks posed by radiation exposure would not be relevant.60
Objective proof would be required to invoke the protection of this law.
A recent Section 502 decision, TNS v. N.L.R.B.,61 shows why a court would
probably order dock workers back to a radioactive port. The TNS work stoppage occurred
after employees in a uranium processing plant demanded that their employer protect them
from a serious radiation exposure problem.62 The controversy was litigated more than 20
years after workers struck over unsafe conditions.63 TNS shows that a gradual threat to

57

414 U.S. 368, 371 (1974).
Id. at 376, expressing the majority’s strong concern that “[a]ny employee who believes a
supervisor or fellow worker incompetent and who honestly fears that at some future time he may commit
some unspecified mistake creating a safety hazard could demand his colleague’s discharge and walk off the
job despite the contractual agreement not to do so.”
59
Supra note 10.
60
Gateway Coal, supra note 57, at 371.
61
Id.
62
Unionized workers walked off their jobs, and were permanently replaced, at a Tennessee plant
that made armor piercing bombs from depleted uranium. Id. at 387-88. The manufacturing process at TNS
released uranium dust into the air. Id. This substance is potentially life threatening because it is a low level
radioactive carcinogen, and its toxicity can harm the kidney. Id. The union repeatedly voiced concerns and
made bargaining proposals about serious health risks posed by uranium dust. Id. at 387-88. Tests conducted
by a state nuclear safety agency and federal counterpart found significant exposure problems, but none so
severe as to clearly risk workers’ lives. Id. at 402.
63
TNS, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 20 (1988), supplemented by TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348 (1992),
remanded by Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82 (1995); reh’g en banc denied
(1995), cert. denied, TNS, Inc. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 516 U.S. 821 (1995); TNS,
Inc. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 329 N.L.R.B. 602 (1999); vacated by TNS, Inc. v.
NLRB, 296 F.3d 384 (2002); cert. denied, Paper, Allied-Industr., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union v.
TNS, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 872 (2003). Related litigation appears in Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v.
NLRB, 806 F.2d 269 (1986).
58
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worker health from radiation does not invoke the protections of Section 502.64
How would a Taft-Hartley order force fearful workers back on the job? TaftHartley courts wield coercive power when they enjoin national emergency disputes.65
Nonetheless, unions have never refused to comply with these orders, so there is no
experience in worker disobedience under Taft-Hartley’s national emergency conditions.
But a useful analogy appears in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America.66 It shows that
federal courts have broad contempt powers to enforce back-to-work orders.67
Taft-Hartley limits injunctions to 80 days. This period might be too short for a
work stoppage sparked by a release of radioactivity. The hazard would not likely abate in
this time. If the port had to remain open for a longer period— for example, until other
ports and logistics systems developed new capacity— Taft-Hartley would not provide an

64

Id.
29 U.S.C. §163. The process for seeking an injunction begins when the President appoints a
Board of Inquiry to determine whether a national emergency exists. 29 U.S.C. §176(a). Usually, the board
takes only one or two days before reaching this finding. Next, the attorney general petitions a federal court
for an injunction. 29 U.S.C. §178. This court proceeding occurs within hours. For example, see United
States v. International Longshoremen’s Association, 293 F.Supp. 97, 99-102 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), in which a
court based its injunction on a series of affidavits which were not subjected to any cross-examination or
other counter-balancing procedure. Usually, a court grants the government’s motion for an injunction. A
court’s authority is provided by 29 U.S.C. § 178.
66
330 U.S. 258 (1947).
67
Following World War II, a series of work stoppages in the spring of 1946 prompted President
Truman to exercise his power under the War Labor Disputes Act to seize, possess, and run these private
workplaces. See Exec. Order No. 9728, 11 Fed. Reg. 5593 (1946). As winter approached, John L. Lewis,
the president of the United Mine Workers, announced his union’s intention to terminate the national labor
agreement, an action that was tantamount to ordering a strike that would crimp the nation’s heating stock.
Id. at 265. The U.S. government, now in possession of the mines, sued in federal district court under the
Declaratory Judgment Act to prevent this action. Id. at 265-66. While the court considered the positions of
the parties, it preserved the status quo by issuing a temporary restraining order against any work stoppage,
but the union and its members ignored this order. Id. at 265-267.
After a quick trial on contempt charges against the union and its president, the judge found that the
defendants had induced the work interruption. Id. at 267-68. The union and president were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of both criminal and civil contempt. Id. at 269. The court fined Lewis $10,000,
and the defendant union $3,500,000. Upholding the judge’s punishments for contempt, the opinion
concluded: “We will not reduce the practical value of the relief granted by limiting the United States, when
the orders have been disobeyed, to a proceeding in criminal contempt, and by denying to the Government
the civil remedies enjoyed by other litigants, concluding the opportunity to demonstrate that disobedience
has occasioned loss.” Id.
65
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additional grant of judicial authority to renew the injunction. Its endpoint authorizes a
president to return to Congress for a resolution.68 Even short work stoppages— for
example, the 11 day interruption of commerce at Pacific ports in 2002— cause serious
economic effects for the nation.69 So, the hypothetical scenario, with its likelihood for a
prolonged work stoppage, would probably test Taft-Hartley’s fuzzy endpoint.
B. The Next 30 Days of a National Emergency Work Dispute:
Re-Enactment of Section 8 of the War Labor Disputes Act
I now consider the 81st day after a court issues a Taft-Hartley injunction. Port
employees, still fearful of radiation exposure, decide to stay away from work until
adequate protection is provided. Congress considered this issue when it fashioned an 80
day limit to Taft-Hartley injunctions.70 The U.S. would face two stark choices: Acquiesce
to the start of an indefinite work stoppage, or extend the prohibition against work refusal.
68

Instead of authorizing long-term or indefinite seizures as a response to national emergency
labor disputes, the Taft-Hartley Act directed the President, in the event a strike had not been settled during
the 80-day injunction period, to submit to Congress “a full and comprehensive report . . . together with such
recommendations as he may see fit to make for consideration and appropriate action.” 61 Stat. 156, 29
U.S.C. (Supp. IV) § 180.
69
Each day of the work stoppage caused the rest of the nation $2 billion. April Fulton, Port
Dispute May Help to Prompt Deal on Seaport Security Bill, CONG. DAILY (Oct. 9, 2002), also available in
2002 WLNR 11725423. Pacific ports are so vital because the Panama Canal is too small to allow large
container ships that are common in trans-Pacific service to pass. The alternative to ship from Asia to the
East Coast is a route that goes through the Suez Canal— an alternative that is too costly for now. See Cost
Is King, TRANSPORTATION & DISTRIBUTION (Dec. 1, 2002), at 25, also available in 2002 WLNR 10782669
(Dec. 1, 2002). By one estimate, a 10-day work stoppage in all Pacific ports would “lead to the loss of
about 90,600 full-time-equivalent jobs (181.2 million hours) and nearly $693 million in federal, state and
local tax revenue.” Evelyn Iritani & Marla Dickerson, The Port Settlement: Tallying Port Dispute’s Costs,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2002), at 1, also available in 2002 WLNR 12416145. The costs of the work stoppage
continued for two months because of a backlog effect. See Paul Nyhan, Back to Normal? Not Right Away—
Backlogs Will Take Months at Reopened Ports, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 9, 2002), at E1, also
available in Westlaw at 2002 WLNR 2129583 (“It will take 60 days, or perhaps longer, to unsnarl U.S.
trade routes that jammed during the 11-day shutdown of West Coast ports. Trains are backed up to the
Rocky Mountains, 25 container ships are stuck in Puget Sound and tens of thousands of tons of wheat and
other foodstuffs are stored along the Columbia River.”).
70
E.g., S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15; 93 Cong.Rec. 3835-3836; id., at 4281. When it
passed the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress believed the 80-day period would allow enough time to determine
whether special legislation should be enacted to meet a unique emergency. Also see Senate Report No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15: “In most instances the force of public opinion should make itself sufficiently felt
in this 80-day period to bring about a peaceful termination of the controversy. Should this expectation fail,
the bill provides for the President laying the matter before Congress for whatever legislation seems
necessary to preserve the health and safety of the Nation in the crisis.”
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The ILWU labor dispute in 2002 clearly suggests that the U.S. would find a way to
extend the dock workers’ duty.71
The War Labor Disputes Act72 provides the best legislative solution for extending
a Taft-Hartley injunction.73 The WLDA established a complex dispute resolution system
to keep workers on the job.74 The president was given authority to seize and operate any
business whose operation was hindered by a work interruption.75 Given the fact that the
WLDA has already addressed work interruptions in a national crisis, this policy option is
feasible. But the scope of the WLDA as it was enacted in 1943 is inappropriately broad
for a crippled port. The law came about after President Roosevelt unilaterally seized
private factories without congressional authority.76 Dire conditions during World War II
fostered tacit approval of these extreme measures, until Congress enacted the WLDA as a
complex seizure law to pressure unions and employers into settling their differences.77
A work stoppage in a crippled port is an isolated crisis, rather than a long-running
series of grave national threats. This type of work refusal also lacks the traditional
71

See Lochhead, supra note 47.
Section 1501, Act June 25, 1943, c. 144, § 1, 57 Stat. 163, The War Labor Disputes Act, 50
U.S.C. App. § 1501, repealed on Sept. 1, 1948, Section 38 of Act of June 25, 1948.
73
See Section 3 of the War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 164, 50 U.S.C.App.Supp., providing a
“power to take immediate possession of any [facility] equipped for the manufacture, production, or mining
of any articles or materials which may be required for the war effort . . . whenever the President finds . . .
and proclaims that there is an interruption of the operation of such . . . [facility] as a result of a strike or
other labor disturbance . . . and that the exercise of such power and authority is necessary to insure the
operation of such [facility] in the interest of the war effort.”
74
The War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1501 (Section 1503 related to the
power of the President to take possession of certain manufacturing facilities; Section 1504 related to terms
of employment at government operated plants; Section 1505 related to applications to the War Labor Board
for changes in the terms of employment at government operated plants; Section 1506 related to interference
with government operation of plants; Section 1507 related to functions and duties of the National War
Labor Board; and Section 1508 related to notice of threatened interruptions in war production.
75
29 U.S.C. §180 limits injunctions to 80 days.
76
See Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., infra note 114,
at 612, reporting that President Roosevelt ordered seizures on twelve occasions prior to the enactment of
the War Labor Disputes Act.
77
29 U.S.C. §180 limits injunctions to 80 days.
72
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conflict over negotiating new labor agreements that plagued union-management
relationships. Wholesale re-enactment of the WLDA is therefore pointless. But Congress
would likely consider passage of Section 8. This established a formal mechanism for
employees to voice their grievances to the government.78 While it created a bargaining
process between the executive branch and workers, Section 8 imposed an extraordinary
constraint by compelling individuals to “continue production under all the conditions
which prevailed when such dispute arose” for 30 days.79
The WLDA expired shortly before Taft-Hartley was passed. Thus, its
enforcement mechanism never co-existed with the national emergency injunction in TaftHartley. Although Section 8 was not enforceable by an injunction, it clearly had power to
coerce workers to stay on the job. Congress held employees financially responsible for
the costs of a premature work stoppage.80
This coercion was challenged in two WLDA cases. In France Packing Co. v.
Dailey,81 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an employer could seek monetary
damages from workers who walked off the job before the 30 day notice period expired.82
78

Section 8(a)(1) set up a de facto bargaining process between unions and the U.S. by providing:
The representative of the employees . . . shall give to the Secretary of Labor, the National
War Labor Board, and the National Labor Relations Board, notice of any such labor
dispute involving such [employer] and employees, together with a statement of the issues
giving rise thereto.
79
Section 8(a)(2) limited the right to strike in these terms:
For not less than thirty days after any notice under paragraph (1) is given, the [employer]
and his employees shall continue production under all the conditions which prevailed
when such dispute arose. . . . , except as they may be modified by mutual agreement or by
decision of the National War Labor Board.
80
In a unique public policy, Section 8(c) made a work stoppage extremely costly to individual
employees— in contrast to holding unions responsible for these actions— when it said:
(c) Any person who is under a duty to perform any act required under subsection (a) and
who willfully fails or refuses to perform such act shall be liable for damages resulting
from such failure or refusal to any person injured thereby and to the United States if so
injured.
81
166 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1948).
82
The court also made clear that the WLDA applied in this case “against three individuals and
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France Packing strictly construed Section 8 of the WLDA as a “national security
measure” that applied “to employers and employees alike in their fundamental obligation
as citizens functioning in a wartime emergency.”83
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted similar reasoning in Hamilton v.
N.L.R.B.84 Employees who engaged in a sudden work stoppage violated the 30 day notice
provision of the WLDA.85 Hamilton strictly construed the law’s requirement that
employees “continue production.”86 This meant that “employees can not be permitted to
discontinue work.”87 The Sixth Circuit gave weight to the war background, stating that
the “essential purpose of Section 8 is to prevent interruptions to war production; this
purpose is defeated if the Act permitted employees to discontinue work during the
cooling-off period.”88 The Hamilton court specifically rejected a constitutional challenge,
stating: “The construction which we give to the provisions of the Act that the employees
shall continue production, namely, that employees are not permitted to cease work during
the 30-day cooling-off period, does not violate any constitutional rights. . . .”89
As Table 1 shows, I rate Section 8 moderately to highly feasible. Its durational
limit on discontinuing work makes the law feasible. So do favorable rulings in France
Packing and Hamilton. This assessment is tempered, however, by legislative ambiguity
over an individual’s intent to quit a job. The sparse judicial history on Section 8 reveals
this problem. The law’s ambiguity is highlighted in strong dissenting opinions.
not against the union of which they are officers,” adding the “statute, in terms, permits this, so that its
propriety at this stage of the litigation cannot be gainsaid.” Id. at 756.
83
Id. at 755.
84
160 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1947).
85
Id. at 468.
86
Id. at 470.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
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Judge O’Connell’s dissent in France Packing concluded that the WLDA violated
the constitutional ban on involuntary servitude. The judge emphasized that “Congress,
constantly reminded of the ban on involuntary servitude and consistently voicing faith in
the reasonableness and patriotism of the individual workingman, drafted Section 8 with a
view to preventing interruptions to war production induced by restraint or coercion.”90
It is also noteworthy that one district judge and three appellate judges ruled in
France Packing, and were evenly split on the constitutionality of the WLDA. In addition
to Judge O’Connell, the district judge in France Packing found that the WLDA violated
the Thirteenth Amendment.91 Hamilton presented a similar pattern in which a lower
ruling relied extensively on legislative history.92 Considering that Section 8 evenly split
the judges and labor board members who adjudicated its constitutionality— with just
enough votes to produce two rulings that upheld the law— I rate the law’s future
feasibility in a range, from moderate to high.
C. Executive Order Policy Options
So far, my analysis has examined statutory responses to national emergency work
crises— the Taft-Hartley Act, and Section 8 of the WLDA. I assess the former as highly
feasible and the latter as more questionable, though still reasonably feasible. But even
90

France Packing, supra note 81, at 758. His opinion drew from this critical passage in the
Congressional Record:
Mr. Elmer: Could this House pass a measure that would compel me to work for some
other man, if I did not want to work for him?
Mr. Harness: Why, certainly not. That is slave labor, and I will not even consider that as a
possible necessity. American Labor is patriotic, and will cooperate with the Government
in wartime. We will accomplish much more if we depend upon voluntary cooperation,
rather then coercion.
Mr. Elmer: If you take away the right to strike, or if you delay the right to strike, then to
that extent you have introduced involuntary servitude, have you not, and that is forbidden
by the Constitution.
Mr. Harness: Of course.
91
France Packing Co. v. Dailey, 67 F.Supp. 841 (D.C. Pa. 1946).
92
Western Tablet & Stationery Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 930, 949 (1946).
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assuming that both policies were successfully implemented in consecutive 80 day and 30
day periods, they would fail to provide a long-term method to force dock workers back
on the job. Unless a lasting solution was found— for example, sufficient quantity of
protective work suits, or expanding capacity at unaffected ports— the nation would be
vulnerable to a costly work stoppage. Critical deadlines would occur in Day 81 (expiry of
a Taft-Hartley injunction), and Day 111 (expiry of a WLDA ban on quitting).
However, the federal government would not run out of policy options. A variety
of executive orders could be used at any point in the crisis timeline. These directives are
potent and far reaching. Courts have generally upheld executive orders that regulate
private entities.93 In a pertinent example, Congress has authorized presidents to approve
contracts to sell port terminals.94 This delegation became a point of contention when
President Bush approved the sale of key U.S. ports to a Dubai entity.95
Recently, Hurricane Katrina furnished an example of this concentrated power to
regulate private employment. Soon after the storm decimated large parts of the Gulf
Coast, President Bush suspended a law that requires payment of prevailing wages,96 a

93

E.g., Building and Const. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002),
upholding Executive Order 13202. Unions sued to block enforcement of the rule, naming as defendants a
variety of government agency heads who administer federal construction contracts— including Joseph
Allbaugh, the Director of the nation’s disaster relief agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). This decree by President George W. Bush had an adverse impact on organized labor by reversing
a requirement that government construction projects use only union labor. Id. at 31.
94
For a lucid explanation of this complex operation, see Statement of Daniella Markham, CFIUS
Overhaul, FED. DOC. CLEARING HOUSE (May 24, 2006), available in 2006 WL 1435307 (F.D.C.H.).
Under the Exon-Florio amendment of section 837(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1993, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (a committee of twelve
federal government agencies such as Treasury, Defense, Justice, Commerce, and Homeland Security)
reviews acquisitions by foreign entities to consider whether these transactions threaten the national security
of the United States. Exon-Florio is intended to “provide an objective, non-partisan mechanism to review
and, if the President finds necessary, to restrict or prohibit foreign investment that may
threaten America’s security.” The president acts on the advice of the CFIUS.
95
Rep. Garrett Writes President, Requesting Status of Transfer of American Ports By DubaiOwned Company, US FED. NEWS (Sept. 26, 2006), 2006 WLNR 16890180.
96
Pres. Proc. No. 7924, 70 FR 54227 (Sept. 8, 2005). By proclamation, President Bush suspended
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euphemism for union pay scale on public works projects. The agility of this executive
power is demonstrated by congressional deliberations to amend an analogous minimum
wage law in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Congress has stalled for years in amending
that wage rate.97 Executive orders bypass the legislative process. This power is
particularly suited for running a crippled port.
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and Roosevelt’s executive orders
demonstrate this sweep of this power to regulate private work. The Emancipation
Proclamation abolished slavery.98 However, this noble act usurped legislative powers.
Congress was deadlocked for years over this matter.99 Lincoln’s fiat also violated the
Constitution,100 insofar as that document institutionalized slavery.101
subchapter IV of Chapter 31 of Title 40 of the U.S. Code— the law that sets wage rates for public works
projects. The proclamation said: “An unprecedented amount of Federal assistance will be needed to restore
the communities that have been ravaged by the hurricane. Accordingly, I find that the conditions caused by
Hurricane Katrina constitute a national emergency.” It concluded that the “wage rates imposed by section
3142 of title 40, United States Code, increase the cost to the Federal Government of providing Federal
assistance to these areas. Suspension of [this statute] . . . will result in greater assistance to these devastated
communities and will permit the employment of thousands of additional individuals.”
97
See Minimum Wage: Reid Promises To Hold Up Pay Raises For Lawmakers Until Wage,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 124, at A-13 (June 28, 2006), reporting on a plan by Senate Minority Leader
Harry Reid plan (D-Nev.) to halt pay raises for lawmakers from going into effect until Congress acts to
increase the minimum wage. Sen. Reid noted that the minimum wage has not been raised since 1997, but
during this time, lawmakers have raised their pay by $31,600.
98
See The Emancipation Proclamation, in the National Archives, at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/american_originals_iv/sections/preliminary_emancipation_proclamation.
html#.
99
See DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 319 (Henry Steele Commager & Milton Cantor eds.,
1988) (discussing Sen. Henry Clay’s resolution of Jan. 29, 1850, resulting in the Compromise of 1850, U.S.
Senate Journal, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 118 ff).
100
See Mark E. Neely Jr., Emancipation Proclamation, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY 551 (Leonard W. Levy & Louis Fisher eds., 1994) (stating: “The proclamation was a
presidential order freeing the slaves in areas of rebellion against the United States.”). Ironically, Lincoln
revoked General Fremont’s freeing of slaves in Missouri in 1861, and remarked: “Can it be pretended that
it is any longer the government of the U.S.— any government of Constitution and laws— wherein a
General, or a President, may make permanent rules of property by proclamation?” Id. Also see the ironic
resolution of the Illinois legislature, condemning the proclamation on constitutional grounds as a “gigantic
usurpation.” Resolution of Illinois State Legislature, reported in ILLINOIS STATE REGISTER, Jan. 7, 1863,
reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, id., at 422.
101
U.S. Const. art I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 2 basing representation and
taxation “by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of
years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons.”
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President Roosevelt’s regulation of private workplaces provides strong precedents
to order port workers back on the job. Executive Order 8802 was a daring and
undemocratic use of this power— requiring federal contractors who supplied the nation’s
World War II arsenal to end race discrimination at work.102 The order was intended to set
a good example to confront Hitler’s ideology of racial superiority.103 Fundamentally,
however, the order addressed a critical labor shortage after millions of Caucasian males
entered the armed services, leaving behind factory jobs in segregationist communities.104
Many orders addressed union-management conflicts with dispute resolution
procedures.105 These negotiation processes were backed by a controversial power. When
a company and union reached impasse, the President issued orders to seize and operate
private workplaces.106 No port was affected by this power, but the U.S. seized and

102

Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941) (Policy Preamble), wherein President
Roosevelt stated: “I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States that there shall be no discrimination
in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national
origin . . . .”
103
See ALBERT R. BUCHANAN, BLACK AMERICANS IN WORLD WAR II 84-88, 98-99 (1977);
RICHARD M. DALFIUME, DESEGREGATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES: FIGHTING ON TWO FRONTS, 19391953 (1969); NEIL A. WYNN, THE AFRO-AMERICAN AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 24 (1976).
104
Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941) (Policy Preamble), citing “evidence that
available and needed workers have been barred from employment in industries engaged in defense
production solely because of considerations of race, creed, color, or national origin, to the detriment of
workers’ morale and of national unity.”
105
Peaceful labor-management relations were deemed essential to win World War II. E.g., Exec.
Order 8716, whose Policy Preamble stated that “it is essential in the present emergency that employers and
employees engaged in production or transportation of materials necessary to national defense shall exert
every possible effort to assure that all work necessary for national defense shall proceed without
interruption and with all possible speed . . . .” The order created the National Defense Mediation Board, and
granted it jurisdiction to settle serious labor disputes by a variety of means. Id. §§ 1(a)-(b); and 2.
106
In manufacturing alone, Roosevelt seized plants and facilities in: Exec. Order No. 8773, 6 Fed.
Reg. 2777 (1941) (seizing North American Aviation), relinquished by Exec. Order No. 8814, 6 Fed. Reg.
3253 (1941); Exec. Order No. 8868, 6 Fed. Reg. 4349 (1941) (seizing Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock
Co.), relinquished by Exec. Order No. 9012, 7 Fed. Reg. 145 (1942); Exec. Order No. 8928, 6 Fed. Reg.
5559 (1941) (seizing Air Associates, Inc.); Exec. Order No. 9225, 7 Fed. Reg. 6627 (1942) (seizing S.A.
Woods Machine Co.); Exec. Order No. 9229, 7 Fed. Reg. 6630 (1942) (seizing General Cable Corp.);
Exec. Order No. 9254, 7 Fed. Reg. 8333 (1942) (seizing Triumph Explosives, Inc.); Exec. Order No. 9351,
8 Fed. Reg. 8097 (1943) (seizing Howarth Pivoted Bearings Co.); Exec. Order No. 9375, 8 Fed. Reg.
12,253 (1943) (seizing Atlantic Basin Iron Works), relinquished by Exec. Order No. 9377, 8 Fed. Reg.
12,963 (1943); Exec. Order No. 9399, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,269 (1943) (seizing Remington-Rand Inc.); Exec.
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operated railroads, an analogous transportation system.107
These examples demonstrate that executive orders are a highly feasible response
to a national emergency work stoppage. They also have potential to be coercive— for
example, to order workers back on the job, much like a Taft-Hartley injunction. But
President Roosevelt’s seizure orders were not as coercive as they appear in print. They
were premised on an explicit consensus by labor and management leaders to forgo strikes
and lockouts during World War II.108 Eventually, Congress codified the president’s
unilateral use of this extraordinary power when it passed the WLDA.109 After World War
II hostilities ended Congress repealed this seizure power.110 Thus, a legislative form of
property seizure no longer exists. A crippled port, therefore, could not be seized and

Order No. 9395B, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,957 (1943) (seizing leather manufacturing plants in Massachusetts),
relinquished by Exec. Order No. 9403, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,957 (1943); Exec. Order No. 9400, 8 Fed. Reg.
16,641 (1943) (seizing Los Angeles Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Corp.); Exec. Order No. 9416, 9 Fed. Reg.
936 (1944) (seizing York Safe & Lock Co.), relinquished by Exec. Order No. 9527, 10 Fed. Reg. 424
(1945); Exec. Order No. 9435, 9 Fed. Reg. 4063 (1944) (seizing Jenkins Bros.); Exec. Order 9436, 9 Fed.
Reg. 4063 (1944) (seizing Ken-Rad Tube and Lamp Co. & Ken-Rad Transmitting Tube Corp.); Exec.
Order No. 9438, 9 Fed. Reg. 4459 (1944) (seizing Montgomery Ward & Co.); Exec. Order No. 9443, 9
Fed. Reg. 5395 (1944) (seizing Hummer Mfg.); Exec. Order No. 9466, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,139 (1944) (seizing
several machine shops); Exec. Order No. 9473, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,613 (1944) (seizing International Nickel
Co.); Exec. Order No. 9475A, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (1944) (seizing Hughes Tool Co.); Exec. Order No.
9477, 9 Fed. Reg. 10,941 (1944) (seizing Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co.); Exec. Order No. 9480, 9 Fed.
Reg. 11,143 (1944) (seizing Twentieth Century Brass Works, Inc.); Exec. Order No. 9484, 9 Fed. Reg.
11,731 (1944) (seizing Farrell Check Steel Co.); Exec. Order No. 9508, 9 Fed. Reg. 15,079 (1944) (seizing
Montgomery Ward & Co.); Exec. Order No. 9511, 10 Fed. Reg. 549 (1945) (seizing Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Co.); Exec. Order No. 9523, 10 Fed. Reg. 2133 (1945) (seizing American Enka Corp.).
107
Exec. Order No. 9108, 7 Fed. Reg. 2201 (1943) (seizing the Toledo, Peoria & Western
Railroad Co.); Exec. Order No. 9341, 8 Fed. Reg. 6323 (1943) (seizing the American Railroad Co. of
Puerto Rico); Exec. Order No. 9412, 8 Fed. Reg. 17,395 (1943) (authorizing seizure of all railroads
threatened by a December 30 strike); Exec. Order No. 9516, 10 Fed. Reg. 1313 (1945) (seizing the
Bingham & Garfield Railroad Co.).
108
Exec. Order No. 9017, 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (1942), stating: “as a result of a conference of
representatives of labor and industry which met at the call of the President on December 17, 1941, it has
been agreed that for the duration of the war there shall be no strikes or lockouts, and that all labor disputes
shall be settled by . . . the peaceful adjustment of such disputes.”
109
See Justice Frankfurter’s historical analysis in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., infra note 114,
at 612-13. President Roosevelt ordered twelve seizures prior to the enactment of the War Labor Disputes
Act, of which only three were sanctioned by existing law. Also see id. at 606, n.11, for a precise
explanation of how the WLDA authorized presidential seizure.
110
57 Stat. 163 et seq., codified at 50 U.S.C.App. §§ 1501-1511 (War Labor Disputes Act expired
on June 30, 1947).
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operated like railroads during World War II.111
Could a president seize and operate a port without congressional authority? No. In
the Korean War, President Truman faced an imminent nationwide strike by the United
Steelworkers of America. He feared this would weaken the U.S. in confronting
communism. After exhausting voluntary efforts to settle a labor dispute between the
union and leading manufacturers, President Truman seized steel factories and ordered
them to continue production.112 Unlike the World War II experience, unions did not
acquiesce to this seizure order, a fact that highlights the involuntary nature of President
Truman’s back-to-work order.113 The order was not challenged, however, on Thirteenth
Amendment grounds. Instead, a steel company persuaded the Supreme Court in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer that the president lacked constitutional authority
to seize private property.114
This national experience is reflected in Table 1, where I conclude that the
executive power to unilaterally seize and operate a stricken port has zero feasibility. To
be clear, port seizure is not completely precluded. Recall that Congress delegated this
power to the president in the WLDA. Earlier, I explained that Section 8 is a policy option
to keep a crippled port open for 30 days. Full-scale seizure and operation of a port is
another policy option, but it requires coordination between the legislative and executive
branches. This option is infeasible, however, without the same labor-management
consensus behind the WLDA. The crippled port scenario lacks this key element.

111

Supra note 107.
See Exec. Order No. 10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952).
113
This point is made clear by Justice Frankfurter’s historical analysis in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co., infra note 114, at 602, n.5 (1952), quoting a key labor leader’s opposition to extending strike
controls in the War Labor Disputes Act after World War II.
114
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
112
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Still, the executive branch retains significant powers to address a national
emergency by executive order. Congress has delegated extensive power under the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA).115 This grants a President
wide authority to implement procurement policies that promote efficiency and
economy.116 Executive Order 12092, issued by President Carter to moderate severe
inflation, imposed stringent wage and price guidelines on the nation’s private sector.117
This vast power was upheld by the D.C. Court of Appeals in AFL-CIO v. Kahn.118
Considering two key facts— the federal government relies on Pacific ports in the course
of procuring goods for itself, and the precedent set in Kahn— a directive pattered after
Executive Order 12092 would appear to be a highly feasible policy option.
However, Executive Order 12092 was enforceable by terminating government
contracts of firms who exceeded voluntary wage and price guidelines.119 This has no
relevance to port workers. They depend on employment with private companies rather
than a government contract. For this reason alone, I conclude that this policy option has
low feasibility.

115

Act, June 30, 1949, c. 288, § 1(a), 63 Stat. 377, amended Oct. 13, 1994, Pub.L. 103-355, Title
X, § 10005(a)(2), 108 Stat. 3406, providing that “[t]his Act may be cited as the ‘Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949,’ codified at 40 U.S.C. § 121(a)(Supp. 2002).
116
40 U.S.C. § 121(a)(Supp. 2002) (“The President may prescribe policies and directives that the
President considers necessary to carry out this subtitle.”).
117
Citing authority under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,
Executive Order 12092 directed the Council on Wage and Price Stability Council to establish wage and
price standards to combat double-digit annual inflation. The order imposed stringent limits on businesses
and workers for price and wage increases. It was enforced by instructing the head of each federal agency
and military department to require that all contractors certify that their compliance with the wage and price
standards.
118
618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the massive
intervention in the nation’s economy by Executive Order 12092. The Court noted that Congress granted the
President broad authority under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA) to
establish procurement policies. Id. at 788-89 (the language in FPASA “recognizes that the Government
generally must have some flexibility to seek the greatest advantage in various situations”).
119
Id. at 786.
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Without incorporating a coercive employment penalty, an executive order that
draws on FPASA would be infeasible. But in the long record of presidential regulation of
employment, two actions stand out as possible examples for synthesizing FPASA and a
back-to-work order, though I rate each as improbable.
One option draws from President Reagan’s firing of over 11,000 air traffic
controllers who engaged in an illegal strike.120 A future president might consider that
precedent, reasoning that port workers are as essential to ground-based commerce as air
transport depends on traffic controllers. But the right to strike is provided in the private
sector, whereas the same right is expressly denied to federal employees.121 Moreover,
President Reagan was the effective employer for federal air traffic controllers. But
presidents do not have supervisory authority over dock workers. Then, there is the
practical matter of finding replacement workers. This was not difficult for President
Reagan, but why would potential replacements want to work in a radioactive port?
Another long shot possibility is based on Executive Order No. 10173. Congress
authorized the president to issue rules and regulations to safeguard U.S. ports and
waterfront facilities.122 President Truman’s order set forth detailed employment

120

On August 3, 1981, PATCO members commenced a nationwide strike against the federal
government. See Clarry v. U.S., 85 F.3d 1041, 1043 (2d Cir. 1996). President Reagan responded that day
by issuing an ultimatum stating that the strikers must return to work within 48 hours or lose their jobs. See
id. at 1044. When approximately 11,000 striking air traffic controllers failed to return to work by August 5,
they were discharged. See id. When the strike began, the law prohibited strikes by federal employees (see 5
U.S.C. § 7311 (1994), providing that “an individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of
the United States. . . if . . . he . . . participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the
Government of the United States”). Id. at 1046. Ruling that President Reagan had authority to ban the
striker’ re-employment by the federal government indefinitely, the Clarry court concluded: “As a
consequence of the plaintiffs' participation in the strike against the United States, the plaintiffs forfeited not
only their positions as federal air traffic controllers but also any right to federal employment.” Id.
121
Compare id. (5 U.S.C. § 7311, which effectively denies federal employees a right to strike),
and supra note 11 (NLRA grants private sector employees a broad right to strike).
122
Public Law 679, 81st Congress, 2d Session, approved August 9, 1950, which amended section
1, Title II of the act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 220, 50 U.S.C. § 191.
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regulations for dock workers and seafarers,123 and applied a higher standard to seafarers
by subjecting them to criminal penalties.124 The order penalized dock workers to a lesser
degree by providing for denial of access to ports. The Coast Guard was empowered
consider the character of dock workers and seafarers125— likely, a metaphor for
Communist sympathies— in ruling on an individual’s eligibility to work in a port. While
it would be unreasonable to equate work refusal at a radioactive port as a character flaw,
Executive Order 10173 was also based on specious and vague reasoning over an
individual’s politics. The order was never challenged on these grounds, so a facsimile
based its logic cannot be ruled out. Still, I rate this policy response as highly infeasible.
III. COMPULSORY WORK AND THE EVOLVING MEANING OF “INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE”
In Part II, I examined policy options to order civilian employees back to work at a
radioactive port. Many individuals would not voluntarily return to work without
significant safety precautions— and these safeguards require substantial time and money.
While the nation’s trade would suffer, these workers would resist back-to-work
directives. Part II anticipated this contumacy, and examined the government’s arsenal of
counter-measures to induce compliance with a back-to-work order. This leads to the
123

Section 6.10 expressly authorized the Coast Guard to regulate the employment of civilians
who work at ports and on maritime vessels. See Section 6.10-5, providing: “Any person . . . seeking access
to any vessel or any waterfront facility within the jurisdiction of the United States may be required to carry
identification credentials issued by or otherwise satisfactory to the Commandant. The Commandant may
define and designate those categories of vessels and areas of the waterfront wherein such credentials are
required.” Section 6.10-7 granted authority to set forth identification credentials which were necessary for
dock access.
124
Subpart 6.18 authorized severe criminal penalties, however, the scope of this power only
extended to persons aboard vessels (“any owner, agent, master, officer, or person in charge, or any member
of the crew of any such vessel”). In Subpart 6.18(a), the order provided for punishment by imprisonment
for not more than ten years and a fine, at the discretion of the court, up to $10,000.
125
In granting authority to set forth identification credentials which were necessary for dock
access, Section 6.10-7 said that the “Commandant shall not issue a Coast Guard Port Security Card if he is
satisfied that the character and habits of life of the applicant . . . within a waterfront facility would be
inimical to the security of the United States.” Section 6.10-9 set forth an appeals process for persons who
claimed a violation of rights under these employment regulation procedures.
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research question in Part III: What is the legal standard for involuntary servitude? This
inquiry is needed to analyze how federal courts would rule on Thirteenth Amendment
challenges to the policy options that are set forth in Table 1.
A. Beyond the Original Purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment:
From Slavery to “Situations Involving Physical or Legal Coercion”
The Thirteenth Amendment resulted from President Lincoln’s Emancipation
Declaration on September 22, 1862.126 Delivered as a battlefield speech after a major
Union victory,127 the proclamation declared a radical policy to free all slaves.128 In
codifying this idea, the Thirteenth Amendment repeated key parts of the proclamation.129
The Amendment quickly evolved from this original intent. The Slaughter-House
Cases130 set the course of this dynamic law. Justice Miller’s majority opinion spoke of
the history “fresh within the memory of us all,”131 a clear reference to enslavement of
Africans and their descendents.132 But this opinion extended the Amendment beyond “the
negro(’s) color and his slavery” and “the grievances of that race.”133 It reasoned: “We do
not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection. . . . If Mexican peonage
or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race

126

See Objects of the War, 1862 Pres. Proc. No. 16, 12 Stat. 1267 (1862).
See The Emancipation Proclamation, in the National Archives, at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/american_originals_iv/sections/preliminary_emancipation_proclamation.
html#.
128
Id., stating: “That on the first day of January in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, . . . the people whereof shall then be in
rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free. . . .”
129
Amendment XIII, Section 1. The Amendment draws its conception of involuntary servitude
from Sec. 9 in the Emancipation Proclamation (“and all slaves of such persons found on (or) being within
any place occupied by rebel forces and afterwards occupied by the forces of the United States, shall be
deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude and not again held as slaves.”).
130
16 Wall. 36 (1872).
131
Id. at 56.
132
Id. at 59.
133
Id.
127
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within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void.”134 U.S. v.
Harris135 reaffirmed this view of the Thirteenth Amendment, concluding that “besides
abolishing slavery . . . [it] gives power to Congress to protect all persons . . . from being
in any way subjected to slavery or involuntary servitude. . . .”136
Congress also took a broader view in passing legislation to implement the
Thirteenth Amendment.137 Lawmakers in 1874 sought to eliminate other forms of
involuntary servitude— specifically, a peculiar form of child exploitation known as the
Padrone system.138 That law, 18 U.S.C. § 1584, remains in effect and criminalizes a
variety of exploitative work arrangements.139
Recent federal courts have agreed that the Thirteenth Amendment and its § 1584
counterpart should not be construed too narrowly.140 Since 1980, these laws have been
134

Id.
106 U.S. 629 (1882).
136
Id. at 639.
137
Amendment XIII, Section 1. Section 2 of the Amendment states: “Congress shall have the
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” In this vein, see 18 U.S.C. § 1584, infra note 139.
138
The law was originally enacted to “to prevent [this] practice of enslaving, buying, selling, or
using Italian children.” 2 Cong. Rec. 4443 (1874) (Rep. Cessna).
139
After recent amendments, 18 U.S.C. § 1584 now provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any
condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within the
United States any person so held, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
See 18 U.S.C.A § 1584, reporting amendments in 1948 (June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 773), 1994 (Sept.
13, 1994, Pub.L. 103-322, Title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(K), 1996 (Sept. 30, 1996, 108 Stat. 2147, Pub.L.
104-208, Div. C, Title II, § 218(a), 110 Stat. 3009-573; and 2000 (Oct. 28, 2000, Pub.L. 106-386, Div. A, §
112(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1486).
140
State courts have reached similar results in refusing to enforce personal service contracts. In a
bold decision that pre-dates the Emancipation Proclamation, an Indiana court refused to hold a “Woman of
Color” to a contract that provided for indentured service, stating: “Deplorable indeed would be the state of
society, if the obligee in every contract had a right to seize the person of the obligor, and force him to
comply with his undertaking.” See The Case of Mary Clark, A Woman of Color, 1 Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1812),
also available in 1821 WL 974 (Ind.), and 12 Am.Dec. 213. More recently, claims of involuntary servitude
have been raised when employees have refused to perform work that they promised under an individual
employment contract or collective bargaining agreement, and employers have sought to restrain a work
stoppage. In these rulings, courts have refused to hold these recalcitrant employees to the remedy of
specific performance, but they have also ruled that back-to-work injunctions are valid. E.g., Pinellas
County Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Board of Public Instruction of Pinellas County, 214 So.2d 34 (Fla.
135
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invoked successfully to end abusive child labor,141 forcible employment of migrant farm
hands,142 intimidation to remain in a religious sect,143 threatening workers with
involuntary commitment to a mental institution,144 and forcible household labor by
isolating immigrants.145
In deciding these cases, federal courts have expanded the meaning of involuntary
servitude. The Sixth Circuit in U.S. v. Lewis advised courts that apply the Thirteenth
Amendment to “consider the realities of modern life.”146 Lewis added: “No longer is the
slave always black and the master white. And, while subtler forms of coercion have
replaced the blatant methods of subjugation practiced in the ante-bellum South, these new
practices are no less effective than their older counterparts.”147 The Fourth Circuit in U.S.
v. Booker observed that “[t]he amendment and the legislation were intended to eradicate
not merely the formal system of slavery that existed in the southern states prior to the
Civil War, but all forms of compulsory, involuntary service.”148 Concurring in this view,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned in U.S. v. Mussry that the “13th Amendment and its enforcing
statutes are designed to apply to a variety of circumstances and conditions. Neither is
limited to the classic form of slavery. Both apply to contemporary as well as to historic

1968) (injunction that prohibits a strike by teachers did not impose involuntary servitude); and in re Block,
50 N.J. 494, 499 (N.J. 1967), concluding: “There is no issue of involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth
Amendment; the individual teachers were free to quit but they could not strike in concert.”
141
U.S. v. King, 840 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1988).
142
U.S. v. Warren, 722 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1985).
143
U.S. v. Lewis, 644 F.Supp. 1391 (W.D. Mi. 1984).
144
U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
145
Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F.Supp.2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), and U.S. v. Veerapol, 312 F.3d
1128 (9th Cir. 2002).
146
Lewis, supra note 143, at 1400.
147
Id.
148
644 F.Supp. 1391 (W.D. Mi. 1986).
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forms of involuntary servitude.”149 The Eleventh Circuit agreed in U.S. v. Warren,
emphasizing that “[v]arious forms of coercion may constitute a holding in involuntary
servitude. The use, or threatened use, of physical force to create a climate of fear is the
most grotesque example of such coercion.”150
All of these cases involved extremes in the mistreatment of workers.151 However,
there are current efforts to expand 18 U.S.C. § 1584 and the Thirteenth Amendment to
mainstream settings. The most suggestive example is Zavala v. Wal-Mart,152 involving
recent claims that the large retailer and its janitorial contractors locked illegal aliens in
stores around the country at night to perform cleaning duties. While a federal district
court found insufficient evidence to support this § 1584 allegation, a milestone was
reached when the judge seriously considered this complaint against Wal-Mart.153
The expanding definition of involuntary servitude has been tempered, however,
by the Supreme Court’s rejection of psychological coercion as a legal standard. This
jurisprudence traces to Judge Friendly’s stingy interpretation of involuntary servitude in
U.S. v. Shackney.154 Rabbi Shackney and his wife recruited and employed the Oros
family from Mexico to work on their kosher chicken farm.155 The workers lived in substandard housing.156 They rarely left the farm,157 and their children did not attend

149

726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984).
772 F.2d 827, 833-34 (11th Cir. 1985).
151
U.S. v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1213 (6th Cir. 1986) (“involuntary servitude cases are few
and far between”).
152
393 F.Supp.2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005).
153
Id. at 310-11.
154
333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
155
Id. at 476-77.
156
Id. at 478 (the walls were made of cardboard, the floor had holes, and the dwelling was heated
by a wood-burning stove).
157
Id. at 479.
150

THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN NATIONAL EMERGENCIES

33

school.158 Key to the government’s prosecution, the Shackneys held the Oros family
against their will by threatening them with deportation.159
Nonetheless, Judge Friendly’s decision reversed the Shackneys’ § 1584
conviction.160 Exploring the psychological dynamics of involuntary servitude, Judge
Friendly believed that threats are endemic in a work relationship.161 Judge Friendly
rejected the idea that the criminal sanctions of § 1584 come “into play whenever an
employee asserts that his will to quit has been subdued by a threat which seriously affects
his future welfare but as to which he still has a choice, however painful.”162 Thus, “a
credible threat of deportation may come close to the line, (but) it still leaves the employee
with a choice, and we do not see how we could fairly bring it within § 1584 without
encompassing other types of threat.”163
More recently, the Supreme Court approved Judge Friendly’s approach in U.S. v.
Kozminski.164 Like Shackney, this case involved a married couple who provided squalid
housing to their farm hands.165 Successfully prosecuting the Kozminskis under § 1584,166

158

Id. at 478.
Id. at 479-80.
160
Id. at 487.
161
Id. (“Friction over employment punctuated by hotheaded threats is well known and
inevitable.”).
162
Id. at 486. A court must weigh the objective options that an employee has at the moment of the
alleged coercion: “involuntary servitude means . . . action by the master causing the servant to have, or to
believe he has, no way to avoid continued service or confinement . . . not a situation where the servant
knows he has a choice between continued service and freedom, even if the master has led him to believe
that the choice may entail consequences that are exceedingly bad.” Id.
163
Id.
164
487 U.S. 931 (1988). It is a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1584 to hold another person to
involuntary servitude.
165
Id. at 934. While Shackney involved employer threats of deportation, the Kozminski family
threatened the two workers— both of whom had IQ scores under 70— with institutionalization if they left
the farm. Id.
166
Id. at 937.
159
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the U.S. theorized that the men were being held at work as “psychological hostages.”167
Justice O’Connor’s opinion rejected this approach. Resolving a conflict among appellate
courts,168 the decision limited involuntary servitude to “situations involving physical or
legal coercion.”169 Providing guidance to future courts, the opinion used the padrone
system as a definitional example. Those children were stranded in large cities in a foreign
country, with no education or other means of self-support. Justice O’Connor concluded
that “these children had no actual means of escaping the padrones’ service; they had no
choice but to work for their masters or risk physical harm.”170
Kozminski’s narrow construction of § 1584 is further revealed by the Court’s
rejection of prosecutor analogies. U.S. attorneys argued that involuntary servitude
prohibits the “compulsion of services by any means that, from the victim’s point of view,
either leaves the victim with no tolerable alternative but to serve the defendant or
deprives the victim of the power of choice.”171 Kozminski rejected this view because it
“would appear to criminalize a broad range of day-to-day activity.”172 Involuntary
servitude “would include compulsion through psychological coercion as well as almost
any other type of speech or conduct intentionally employed to persuade a reluctant person
to work.”173 Justice O’Connor believed that “the Government’s interpretation would
167

Id. at 936.
Id. at 939.
169
Id. at 947. While these terms are vague, they were more clearly explained in terms of the
historical context of the Thirteenth Amendment and § 1584. Justice O’Connor reasoned that Congress
intended to outlaw the padrone system, and other forms of exploitation that take “advantage of the special
vulnerabilities of their victims, placing them in situations where they were physically unable to leave.” Id.
at 948.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 949.
172
Id.
173
Id. This might criminalize a parent’s threat of “withdrawal of affection” as coercion to compel
an adult son or daughter to work in the family business, or a political leader’s use of “charisma to induce
others to work without pay or a religious leader who obtains personal services by means of religious
168
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delegate to prosecutors and juries the inherently legislative task of determining what type
of coercive activities are so morally reprehensible that they should be punished as
crimes.”174 Her opinion lauded Judge Friendly’s narrow interpretation,175 and notably, it
upheld key exceptions to the Thirteenth Amendment.176
B. The Public Service Exception to the 13th Amendment
While the 13th Amendment protects individuals from legal coercion, there remains
an exception for public service compelled by a government body. The 13th Amendment
does not prevent state or federal governments from using criminal sanctions to compel
individuals to perform civic duties such as jury service177 and military service.178
Two longstanding Supreme Court precedents seem particularly relevant to order
dock workers back to a crippled port. One permits local government to conscript citizens
for road duty. Butler v. Perry179 upheld a Florida law that required men to work without
pay for six days every year on roads and bridges.180 Failure to answer a road work
summons was a criminal offense.181 J.W. Butler was jailed for 30 days after he ignored
this duty and failed to make an alternate arrangement.182
The Supreme Court rejected Mr. Butler’s 13th Amendment challenge. Justice
McReynolds’ opinion recalled that text for the 13th Amendment came from the Ordinance
indoctrination.” Id.
174
Id. She explained that “[b]y its terms the [Thirteenth] Amendment excludes involuntary
servitude imposed as legal punishment for a crime.” Id.
175
Id. at 950.
176
Id. at 943-44, emphasizing that “the Court has recognized that the prohibition against
involuntary servitude does not prevent the State or Federal Governments from compelling their citizens, by
threat of criminal sanction, to perform certain civic duties.”
177
Hurtado v. U.S., 410 U.S. 578 (1973), at 589, n.11.
178
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
179
240 U.S. 328 (1916).
180
Id. at 329.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 330.
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of 1787,183 which created the Northwest Territory. That area was conceived as a slavefree jurisdiction, but nevertheless the Territory approved the ancient tradition of
conscripting men to build roads and bridges.184 This duty traced to Roman law, which
decreed that “with respect to the construction and repairing of ways and bridges no class
of men of whatever rank or dignity should be exempted”185 from conscription. Courts
upheld state authority to compel this physical labor on pain of imprisonment.186 Giving
weight to this long history, the Court concluded that Congress did not abolish compulsory
public service when it enacted the 13th Amendment.187
Butler reflects judicial embrace of the ancient doctrine, trinoda necessitis,
“meaning the threefold necessary public duties. . . : repairing bridges, maintaining castles
or garrisons, and going on expeditions to repel invasions . . . .”188 This doctrine of
compulsory service appeared “as early as 1550, [when] the care of the public roads of
England was first left to the male inhabitants of parishes.”189 Blackstone’s Commentaries
said: “Every parish is bound of common right to keep the highroads that go through it in
good and sufficient repair. . . . From this burden no man was exempt by our ancient laws,
183

Id. at 332, quoting 1 Stat. at L.53, note (the government of the Northwest Territory provided
that “[t]here shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in
punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted”).
184
Id.
185
Id. at 331.
186
Id. citing in re Dassler, 35 Kan. 678 (1886); State v. Wheeler, 141 N.C. 773 (1906); State v.
Rayburn, 101 Pac. 1029 (1909); State v. Halifax, 15 N.C. 345 (1883); and Sawyer v. Alton, 4 Ill. 127
(1841).
187
Id. at 333. Conscription of free men to perform road duty stretched from the Roman Empire to
the Middle Ages, and continued into the 20th century. Id. at 331-32. Twenty-seven states in the U.S. had
laws similar to the Florida statute. Justice McReynolds believed that the 13th Amendment “was adopted
with reference to conditions existing since the foundation of our government, and the term ‘involuntary
servitude’ was intended to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which, in
practical operation, would tend to produce like undesirable results.” Id. at 332. He noted, however, that the
Amendment “introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services always treated as exceptional.” Id.
188
Galoway v. State, 202 S.W. 76, 76 (1918), quoting Black, L. DICT. and 38 CYC. 1994 (on the
burdens to which all owners of lands were held liable by the Saxon law). Trinoda necessitas is cited in
Butler, supra note 179, at 331.
189
State v. Rayburn, 101 P. 1029, 1031 (1909).

THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN NATIONAL EMERGENCIES

37

whatever other immunities he might enjoy; this being a part of the trinoda necessitas, to
which every man’s estate was subject.”190 Frequently, states imposed this doctrine on its
citizens, requiring individuals to provide road, military, and jury duty.191
Current courts have breathed new life into this civic duty principle. They have
upheld service requirements that were resisted by a conscientious objector who refused to
perform charitable duties in lieu of military service,192 and high school students who
resisted graduation requirements to work on community service projects.193
C. The Maritime Duty Exception to the Thirteenth Amendment
The other longstanding Supreme Court precedent that creates an exception to the
Thirteenth Amendment is Robertson v. Baldwin.194 Mr. Robertson and other merchant
seamen agreed to shipping articles in a contract for a lengthy voyage up and down the
Pacific coast.195 The men grew dissatisfied with their employment, and went AWOL in
Astoria, Oregon. Police arrested them for maritime desertion, an offense punishable
190

Id. at 1032, quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, at 538.
E.g., Sawyer v. City of Alton, 3 Scam. 127 (1841); Town of Pleasant v. Kost, 29 Ill. 490
(1863); Fox v. City of Rockford, 38 Ill. 451 (1865); and Proffit v. Anderson, Deputy Sheriff, 20 S.E. 887
(1894).
192
Howze v. U.S., 272 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1959). Mr. Howze was ordered to report to the Los
Angeles County Department of Charities for civilian work after being excused from military service as a
conscientious objector. He reported to the building but refused to accept any duties. He was therefore
indicted for failing to perform a duty required under the Universal Military Service and Training Act.
Rejecting Mr. Holze’s claim that the law held him to a condition of involuntary servitude, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned: “The power of Congress to raise armies, and to take effective measures to preserve
their efficiency, is not limited by either the Thirteenth Amendment, or the absence of a military
emergency.” Id. at 148.
193
Steirer by Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School Dist., 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1993); Immediato by
Immediato v. Rye Neck School Dist., 873 F.Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); and Herndon by Herndon v.
Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996). The vitality of Butler is revealed in
this passage from Steier, where the court saw no legal difference between a local government body
requiring the performance of unpaid road work of all able men, and a school board that required students to
perform 60 hours of voluntary community service as a condition to graduate from high school:
“Significantly, not even every situation in which an individual faces a choice between labor or legal
sanction constitutes involuntary servitude. Governments may require individuals to perform certain wellestablished civic duties. . . .” Id. at 999. The court expressly affirmed Butler as authority. Id.
194
165 U.S. 275 (1897).
195
Id. at 276. The contract was subject to a federal law that prohibits desertion and all other forms
of work abandonment.
191
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under federal law.196 After being jailed for 16 days, the men were forcibly returned to the
ship. They remained disobedient, causing the ship to discharge them in San Francisco to
the custody of federal marshals.197 Suing on a writ of habeas corpus, Mr. Robertson said
that the federal law subjected him to involuntary servitude.
He lost his case before the Supreme Court. While his employment contract
required a form of servitude to the ship, the agreement was voluntary.198 Personal
servitude contracts of this type, common in Great Britain, were also enforceable by
criminal sanctions.199 The majority opinion in Robertson conceded that the U.S. had more
personal freedoms.200 Nevertheless, legal authorities approved forcible subjection of
merchant seamen “900 years before the birth of Christ.”201 As in the U.S., the Greek citystate of Rhodes required “payment of damages by seamen who absent themselves from
their ships without leave, or for their imprisonment, or forcible conveyance on board.”202
Courts continue to recognize Robertson as a valid authority. In a decision steeped
in maritime law and tradition, N.L.R.B. v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. reversed a labor board
finding that a captain coercively interrogated a ship’s navigator about a message that he
196

Id. at 276-77 (Act of July 20, 1790 provided that if any seaman who signed a contract to
perform a voyage deserts or absents himself, “it shall be lawful for any justice of the peace within the
United States, upon the complaint of the master, to issue his warrant to apprehend such deserter.”).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 281.
200
Id. (“The breach of a contract for personal service has not, however, been recognized in this
country as involving a liability to criminal punishment, except in the cases of soldiers, sailors, and possibly
some others; nor would public opinion tolerate a statute to that effect.”).
201
The majority relied on a vast body of ancient precedent, beginning with regulations in the
Greek state of Rhodes that restrained the personal freedom of seamen. Id. at 329. A severe decree by the
Hanseatic League in 1597 allowed authorities to keep AWOL seamen in prison “upon bread and water for
one year.” Id. at 330. More recently, the majority referred to an act of 1647, passed in Massachusetts, that
treated a seaman who left his vessel before its voyage ended as “a runaway servant.” Id.
202
Id. at 285. Butler also rejected the Thirteenth Amendment challenge because it saw no
evidence that the Bill of Rights meant to abolish this restriction on the liberty of merchant seaman.
Congress never intended that this maritime law against desertion and absence without leave, “which was in
force in this country for more than 60 years before the thirteenth amendment was adopted,” could apply to
the contracts of seamen. Id. at 287.
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radioed to that federal agency.203 Courts have also broadened Robertson as a precedent,
for example, by ordering an attorney against his will to represent a Title VII plaintiff,204
and ordering high school students to perform unpaid lunchroom duty.205
IV. COMPULSORY LABOR IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY?
A THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Here, in Part IV, we arrive at the heart of my analysis: Would any of the feasible
back-to-work orders violate the Thirteenth Amendment ban on involuntary servitude? On
one hand, precedent and history would clearly be on the government’s side. Also, courts
are inclined to limit economic harm caused by a critical work stoppage. But how much
weight would a court give to protecting workers from an extraordinary hazard? In sum,
during a national emergency work stoppage, how would a court strike a balance between
individual liberty interests and society’s requirements for order, stability, and security?
A court would likely uphold the constitutionality of the feasible back-to-work
orders in Part II. These orders provide only temporary authority to halt a work stoppage.
Even in national emergency legislation, Congress avoided a public policy that compels
workers to stay on the job indefinitely.206 My research suggests that the longest feasible

203

837 F.2d 1387, 1394 (5th Cir. 1988) Examining Robertson at length, the Fifth Circuit came to
the same conclusion as its 19th Century forbear:
Recognized as an anomaly in relations of master and servant is the maritime concept of
the restricted freedom of a seaman which the Supreme Court acknowledged in Robertson
(citation omitted). From the earliest historical period the contract of the sailor has been
treated as an exceptional one, and involving, to a certain extent, the surrender of his
personal liberty during the life of the contract.
Id. at 1397.
204
Brooks v. Central Bank of Birmingham, 1982 WL 365 (N.D.Ala. 1982).
205
Bobilin v. Bd. of Ed., State of Hawaii, 403 F.Supp. 1095 (D.C. Hawaii 1975).
206
Accord, United Steelworkers of Am. v. U.S., 361 U.S. 39, 57 (1959), stating: “In the national
emergency provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, Congress has with particularity described
the duration of the injunction to be granted.” The Court added that “it is a primary purpose of the Act to
stop the national emergency at least for eighty days, which would be defeated if a court were left with
discretion to withhold an injunction and thereby permit continuation of an emergency it has found to exist.”
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period that workers could be ordered on the job is 110 days.207
Courts would likely reject a Thirteenth Amendment challenge to consecutive 80day and 30-day work orders. These decrees suggest analogies to the facts, holding, and
reasoning of Butler. Florida imposed a six day work requirement in Butler with no pay.
Similarly, the duration of a Taft-Hartley injunction and WLDA order would be limited.
While this mandatory work period is longer, it is tempered by the fact that neither TaftHartley nor the WLDA lowers a worker’s pay. In contrast, Butler mandated unpaid work.
Butler’s heavy reliance on trinoda necessitas would be pivotal in a Thirteenth
Amendment challenge. This precept is central to the American legal conception of
mandatory public service.208 Butler not only gave weight to an 11th century principle,209
but applied it to current realities.210 Trinoda necessitas has endured for a millennium
because of its vital social utility: Society requires infrastructure for transportation, and
occasions arise when states must temporarily impose involuntary servitude on particular
members. Just as Butler applied trinoda necessitas beyond its literal confines to include
roads in the emergent automotive era, a court would likely expand trinoda necessitas to a
crippled Pacific port that bridges trade between Asian and U.S. businesses.
207

I emphasize that 110 days seems to be the outer limit of a work-quitting restriction; and in the
private sector, the federal government has never sequenced a strike or quit restriction in this fashion.
Nevertheless, this period seems feasible because large Pacific ports are chokepoints in the nation’s
economy. Total closure of a crippled facility seems out of the question, and a 110 day work period would
appear to grant time to muster protective equipment for workers at a crippled port, or develop new capacity
at other U.S. ports.
208
See Butler, supra note 179, at 331, stating:
From this burthen no man was exempt by our ancient laws, whatever other immunities he
might enjoy: this being part of the trinoda neceesitas, to which every man’s estate was
subject; viz., expeditio contra hostem, arcium constructio, et pontium reparatio. For,
though the reparation of bridges only is expressed, yet that of roads also must be
understood; as in the Roman law, with respect to the construction and repairing of ways
and bridges no class of men of whatever rank or dignity should be exempted. The trinoda
neceesitas was an obligation falling on all freemen, or at least on all free householders.
209
Id. citing VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY IN THE ELEVENTH CENTURY, p. 82.
210
Id. at 331 (“For, though the reparation of bridges only is expressed, yet that of roads also must
be understood.”).
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Table 2
Analysis of Dock Workers’ Claim that Back-to-Work Order
Violates the Thirteenth Amendment
More Likely Ruling:
Court Upholds Consecutive Back-to-Work Orders under Taft-Hartley (80 Days)
and Section 8 of a Re-Enacted War Labor Disputes Act (30 days)
Strongest Rationale

• Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328,
331 (1916): trinoda necessitis—
the public duty to repair bridges,
maintain castles or garrisons, and
go on expeditions to repel
invasions has never been
abolished, and over time has been
extended to compulsory service
in schools and charities. Ports are
analogous to roads and bridges as
essential arteries of commerce.

Alternative Rationale

• Kozminski v. Baldwin, 487 U.S.
931, 943-44 (1988): Although a
back-to-work order is enforced by
legal coercion in the form of stiff
fines and imprisonment, the
Supreme Court “has recognized
that the prohibition against
involuntary servitude does not
prevent the State or Federal
Governments from compelling
their citizens, by threat of
criminal sanction, to perform
certain civic duties.”

Weakest Rationale

• Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S.
275, 287 (1897): Congress never
intended that maritime law
against desertion, “which was in
force in this country for more
than 60 years before the
thirteenth amendment was
adopted,” be applied to the
contracts of seamen. Dock work
is analogous because it is
inextricably linked to maritime
commerce.

Less Likely Ruling:
Court Overturns Consecutive Back-to-Work Orders under Taft-Hartley (80 Days)
and Section 8 of a Re-Enacted War Labor Disputes Act (30 days)
Strongest Rationale

• Kozminski v. Baldwin, 487 U.S.
931 (1988): While the Supreme
Court rejected psychological
coercion as a 13th Amendment
standard, it equated involuntary
servitude to situations where
workers have “no choice but to
work for their masters or risk
physical harm.”

Alternative Rationale

• Exec. Order No. 10173, Subpt.
6.18, authorizing severe criminal
penalties but only for a vessel’s
owner, agent, master, officer, or
person in charge, or any member
of the crew”: In national
emergency orders involving
ports, the law has distinguished
seamen and dock workers,
subjecting the former to harsh
penalties while penalizing dock
workers by denying access to
work.

Weakest Rationale

• Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328
(1916): trinoda necessitis has not
traditionally created public
service obligations that pose a
direct threat to personal welfare
and safety.
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In addition, while the Supreme Court rarely examines involuntary servitude, it has
cited Butler approvingly on every occasion. Pollock v. Williams struck down a state law
that enforced peonage.211 Nevertheless, this important civil rights ruling carefully
preserved the influence of Butler.212 When the Supreme Court most recently ruled on
involuntary servitude in Kozminski, the majority opinion cited Butler on three different
occasions.213 This decision explicitly reaffirmed Butler as a precedent.214
Less likely, courts would overturn mandatory port work orders on Thirteenth
Amendment grounds. While Butler has been applied to contemporary forms of
compulsory public service, trinoda necessitas has never been imposed when individuals
face threats to health and safety. Butler approved a state imposed requirement of hard
physical labor, but this fell short of exposing individuals to physical hazards. The law in
Butler offered citizens an alternative to physical labor in the form of road taxes.
Thus, a court could distinguish Butler by emphasizing Judge Friendly’s view of
involuntary servitude. He reasoned that the Thirteenth Amendment does not come “into
play whenever an employee asserts that his will to quit has been subdued by a threat
which seriously affects his future welfare but as to which he still has a choice, however
painful.”215 But when a dock worker must choose between obeying a court order on pain
of imprisonment, and radiation exposure, he has much less choice than the immigrant
who labors under a threat of deportation. A court might conclude that the choices for a
dock worker are so unreasonable that the individual has no choice at all.
211

Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
Id. at 17-18, n.28 , noting: “Forced labor in some special circumstances may be consistent with
the general basic system of free labor. For example, forced labor has been sustained as a means of
punishing crime, and there are duties such as work on highways.”
213
Kozminski, supra note 164, at 942 (two separate citations), and 944.
214
Id. at 944.
215
Id. at 950.
212
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Robertson would also play a role in a court’s ruling on restoring work at a
crippled port. In upholding a prison term for a seaman’s desertion, Robertson created an
exception to the Thirteenth Amendment. But would this exception extend to dock
workers? Predicting the reach of Robertson is harder than Butler because the work of
seamen and dock workers is not as similar as the connection between roads and ports.
How could a court analogize the occupations of seamen and dock workers? Both
perform work on an anchored ship at port. ILWU workers routinely board ships to do
their jobs.216 According to Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B.,217 ships that are anchored dockside in ports are subject to maritime law.218 Furthermore, Southern S.S. explored how a
work stoppage by seamen disrupted transfer of cargo219— a job action that would affect
not only a ship in navigable waters, but also a port. This decision thereby extended the

216

See Pacific Coast Marine Safety Code 2002 Revision ILWU and PMA,
http://www.ilwu.org/longshore/contracts/upload/2002_PCMSC.pdf. To illustrate this connection, Rule 234
provides that a “life net furnished by the vessel shall be rigged under all gangways and accommodation
ladders used by employees in such a manner as to prevent a person falling between the ship and the dock.”
Id. at 6. Rule 271 says that if “a ship, boat, or vessel is alongside any other ship, boat, or other vessel, and
persons employed are required to pass from one to the other, a safe means of access shall be provided.” Id.
at 14. Also, Rule 1048 provides: “When a crane is loading or unloading a tier of containers across a vessel,
employees working aloft on that tier shall maintain a minimum athwartship distance of five (5) container
widths or half the width of the tier, whichever is greater, offshore of the container being loaded or
unloaded.” Id. at 59.
217
316 U.S. 31, 41 (1942): “The water in the harbor of Houston is certainly navigable, and a boat
at dock there is obviously within the territorial limits of the United States.”
218
Id.
219
The work stoppage began when a seaman failed to turn the steam on deck for use in loading
the cargo. Id. at 34. This fact is emphasized because the striker’s action was directly related to the work of
unloading cargo. A management crew management turned on the steam, in order to start the unloading
process, but again was thwarted when a deck fireman left his post. The record shows that from “that time
until evening the strikers sat quietly by, engaging in no violence and not interfering with the officers of the
ship or the non-striking members of the crew who proceeded with the loading of the cargo.” Id. Again, this
shows that this work stoppage interfered with the unloading process, an activity that clearly falls today
within the work jurisdiction of Pacific ILWU members. The captain ordered strikers to return to work—
another part of the hypothetical scenario— and they refused. The crew “continued to refuse after a deputy
United States Shipping Commissioner came aboard and read to them that provision of their shipping
articles in which they had promised ‘to be obedient to the lawful commands’ of the master.” Here, too, is
another factual similarity— the use of federal authority to end a work stoppage by directing workers to go
back to their jobs. Id. at 35.
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law against maritime work abandonment beyond the desertion case in Robertson.220 A
future court could reason that a work stoppage at a crippled port is controlled by the
strictures against work abandonment in Robertson and Southern S.S.221
Robertson has already been extended beyond cases involving maritime desertion.
The strikers in Southern S.S. were not imprisoned pursuant to federal mutiny law. They
were simply denied the protection of the NLRA, a law that otherwise privileged their
work stoppage.222 If the rationale for barring maritime desertion extends to strikes on
docked vessels, then any work stoppage which interferes with transfer of a ship’s cargo
falls outside the shelter of the Thirteenth Amendment. The progeny of Robertson suggest
that dock workers could be compelled to work amid radiation in a national emergency.223
However, the analogy between maritime employment and dock work is strained,
even if workers these occupations co-mingle in ports while they transfer cargo. A
seaman’s duty to a captain has no parallel in civilian employment. Dock workers are led
by foremen, who are common supervisors.224 The ancient curtailment of a seaman’s right
to quit his work does not apply to dock work, notwithstanding the close proximity of their
220

By applying the federal maritime law that prohibits mutiny to a dispute that occurred in a port,
Southern S.S. extended this law to the physical boundary that separates the sea and land.
221
S.S. Southern broadened the concept of mutiny at sea to include activity that was otherwise
protected under the NLRA: “The water in the harbor of Houston is certainly navigable, and a boat at dock
there is obviously within the territorial limits of the United States. The words of the [mutiny] statute alone,
therefore, do not warrant an exception in the case of a vessel situated as the City of Fort Worth was when
the strike occurred.” Id. at 41.
222
Id. at 46-47.
223
There is more evidence to suggest the plausibility of this analogy. The Supreme Court recently
adapted its reasoning in Southern S.S. to a new context, illegal immigration. In Hoffman Plastic
Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), the Court equated the Board’s improper remedy in
compensating illegal aliens with the Board’s much earlier order to compensate law-breaking strikers who
obstructed the unloading of the City of Forth Worth. In sum, Hoffman Plastic Compounds broadened the
reach of an isolated desertion case to the current context of illegal immigration.
224
Pacific Coast Walking Bosses and Foremen’s Agreement, (July 1, 2002 – July 1, 2008)
(Section 1.1, defining Walking Bosses and Foremen as “direct supervisory representatives of the
Employers in the performance of all cargo handling stevedoring activities”), available at
http://www.ilwu.org/longshore/contracts/index.cfm .
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jobs in a port. Congress recognized this distinction in 1950 when it authorized the
president to safeguard U.S. ports and waterfront facilities.225 Even though employment
regulations applied to dock workers and seamen,226 only seamen and crew members were
subject to criminal penalties.227 Dock workers faced a much milder sanction, denial of
access to the port— ironically, the kind of physical removal from port work that
individuals in this hypothetical would prefer.
V. CONCLUSIONS: BEYOND EMERGENCY WORK IN CRIPPLED PORTS
My inquiry now broadens beyond crippled ports to compulsory labor in other
national emergencies. The U.S. has become vulnerable to serious economic disruptions.
Terror attacks have interfered with financial markets, and the nation’s air transport and
postal systems. Putting terrorism aside, extraordinary natural disasters have significant
potential to cause national emergencies. Hurricane Katrina’s severe impact228 suggests
the possibility of other weather calamities, while geologists believe that California is ripe
for a major earthquake.229 SARs recently impacted the global economy.230 Meanwhile,
health experts worry that avian flu has catastrophic potential.231 Congress is concerned

225

Public Law 679, 81st Congress, 2d Session, approved August 9, 1950, which amended section
1, Title II of the act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 220, 50 U.S.C. § 191.
226
See supra notes 123 and 125.
227
See supra note 124.
228
See supra notes 2-4.
229
Tammy Krikorian, Southern California Overdue for An Earthquake, SUN (YUMA, AZ.), June
23, 2006, page unavailable online, at 2006 WLNR 10881597.
230
U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-In) Holds A Hearing On Avian Flu Preparedness - Part 5,
FDCH CAPITAL TRANSCRIPTS (Nov. 9, 2005), at 2005 WLNR 18273490 (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services estimates that SARS cost the global economy $30 billion to $50 billion, even though it
caused only around 8,000 infections worldwide. A pandemic could infect billions).
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Jeffrey Staples et al., Preparing for a Pandemic, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 1, 2006), at 20,
available at 2006 WLNR 9075328 (worst case estimate by the World Health Organization shows that 30%
of the world’s population could be stricken over the course of roughly a year, resulting in as many as 150
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that a pandemic would shrink the nation’s labor supply.232 Health care workers would be
exposed to the disease and strain the medical system’s capacity.233 Congress estimates
that a pandemic could kill 2.5% of the workforce.234 Like health care workers, the general
labor force would shrink as workers became ill, or stayed at home out of fear.235 Table 3
(infra) is a template of the legal landscape for national emergencies that have already
affected, or could affect, key occupations. It summarizes these conclusions:
Conclusion No. 1: A Taft-Hartley injunction— the most potent legal tool to order
fearful workers back on the job— is only available for private sector jobs such as dock
workers, pharmaceutical plant workers, utility workers (phone, gas, and electrical power),
and construction workers. Most doctors and nurses are subject to this federal law, but
those who are public employees are beyond the purview of Taft-Hartley. Thus, the U.S.
has limited jurisdiction over critical jobs in a national emergency work stoppage.
Taft-Hartley injunctions have important advantages over state counterparts. They
last for 80 days, a lengthy but pre-determined period. This is long enough to weather the
worst effects of closed ports, pandemic disease, or a catastrophic hurricane. In contrast,
temporary restraining orders expire too soon,236 while permanent orders are infeasible
because of their unlimited duration. In addition, Congress designed Taft-Hartley
injunctions to acquire legitimacy by mobilizing public opinion against strikers.237

232

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A POTENTIAL INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: POSSIBLE
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY ISSUES (December 8, 2005), at 9.
233
Id. at 10 (“some workers [would] become sick and others [would stay] away to care for others
or to avoid becoming ill”).
234
Id. at 11.
235
Id. at 9.
236
In Louisiana, where police officers abandoned their jobs, the law provides courts authority to
issue a temporary restraining order for up to ten days, and also provides for extending this period for one or
more periods. La.C.C.P. Art. 3604 (2006).
237
See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. at 15, reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the
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Table 3
Jobs in National Emergencies: Government Power to Compel Labor
Versus Thirteenth Amendment Employee Protections
Private-Sector Jobs
Are Italicized;
Public-Sector Jobs
Are in Bold Font;
Jobs in Both Sectors
Are Underlined

National
Emergency

Taft-Hartley Act Executive
Coverage and
Order
80 Day Injunction Coverage

13th Amendment
Protection

Dock Workers

Radioactive
Exposure

Yes

Yes

Doubtful

Police

Hurricane
Katrina

No

No

Doubtful

Postal

Anthrax
Attack

No

Yes

Questionable

Congressional
Staff

Anthrax
Attack

No

Questionable

Likely

Emergency
Doctors

Smallpox
Attack

Partial

Partial

Questionable

Nurses

SARS and
Hurricane
Katrina

Partial

Partial

Questionable

Pharmaceutical
Plant Workers

Avian
Flu

Yes

Yes

Likely

Fire

9/11

No

No

Doubtful

Utility Workers

9/11

Yes

Yes

Likely

Sanitation

9/11

No

No

Likely

Construction

9/11

Yes

Yes

Likely

Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, at 463, 472 (1948): “In most instances the force of public
opinion should make itself sufficiently felt in (the) 80-day period (during which the strike is enjoined) to
bring about a peaceful termination of the controversy.”
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Conclusion No. 2: Key emergency response jobs— notably police, fire, and
sanitation— are regulated by municipal and state courts, and are therefore harder to run
in disasters.238 Hurricane Katrina illustrates this problem. New Orleans took no legal
action to enjoin police officers who stopped working, even though state law prohibits this
conduct.239 The region was too devastated for courts to be open.240 The most effective
response to this problem is to relax broad strictures in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878
against using federal troops in domestic crises.241 This recommendation also applies to
my proposal in Conclusion No. 4 to limit Taft-Hartley injunctions— that is, the military
should serve in place of unwilling civilian workers during these extreme emergencies.
Conclusion No. 3: Employee protection under the 13th Amendment depends on
two factors that vary by national emergency— the scope of trinoda necessitas as it bears
on specific types of work, and the imminent threat to an individual’s life by working in
great danger. Butler upheld a compulsory work law out of deference to a common law

238

Id. This is because these public employees are excluded from the coverage of the National
Labor Relations Act, the law that Taft-Hartley amends. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), broadly defining employers
but excluding “the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or . . . or any State or
political subdivision thereof. . . .”
239
See City of New Orleans v. Police Ass’n of Louisiana, Teamsters Local No. 253, 369 So.2d
188, 189 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1979), explaining in dicta that while Louisiana has a law that broadly prohibits
issuance of state court injunctions of strikes, this law does apply to police strikes: “In the case of a police
strike, the concerted refusal to work by the peace-keeping employees of the government not only leaves
society defenseless against crime but even inspires lawlessness.” In prophetic words, the court added: More
swiftly and surely than any other, a strike by law enforcement officers takes law enforcement and
consequently the rule of law itself from our society. A police strike begins as anarchy and leads towards
terrorism.” Id.
240
Id. After Hurricane Katrina, the Louisiana Supreme Court was shut down by a closure order
from August 29 through November 25. See Courts Reopen, Or Work At Other Sites, NEW ORLEANS TIMES
PICAYUNE (Oct. 27, 2005), at 4, also available in 2005 WLNR 17376435.
241
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 332 (2006), prescribing use of militia and armed forces to enforce federal
authority under the Posse Comitatus Act. Also see Chris Strohm, Official Says Plans for Federal Crisis
Response Still Needed, CONG. DAILY (July 14, 2006), at 2006 WL 12219549, explaining that the Defense
Department’s response to Hurricane Katrina revealed problems that needed to be fixed regarding the
military’s handling of domestic disasters.
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doctrine.242 Road duty was hard labor for one week each year, and not dangerous to one’s
health. This probably tipped the balance against the individual who asserted a Thirteenth
Amendment claim. My research suggests that port employment amid radioactivity that
does not threaten imminent injury is probably close enough to Butler’s road duty to
defeat a dock worker’s Thirteenth Amendment claim.243
But turning to Table 3, I postulate that the same law would likely prevent the U.S.
from ordering sick pharmaceutical factory workers back on the job, regardless of the
public’s need. This is because trinoda necessitas is closely tied to construction and repair
of public infrastructure. Pharmaceutical work is too remote to apply the doctrine.
Moreover, while the hazard to dock workers in this Article is speculative,244 flu-stricken
workers would present a court with a more tangible peril. Applying Kozminski, a judge
would likely find that the choice presented to these pharmaceutical employees— work
while stricken with the flu, or face contempt sanctions— differs enough from the threat
of deportation in Shackney or institutionalization in Kozminski to grant Thirteenth
Amendment protection.
In view of the serious health effects from exposure to airborne toxins that
followed the 9/11 attacks,245 courts would probably grant Thirteenth Amendment
protection to utility and construction workers who are ordered against their will to work
without protective gear in another inferno.246 Similar protection would probably be
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Supra notes 208-09.
Id.
244
Supra note 10, RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES:
245
Carl Campanile, Hill Wants $2B For Sick WTC Heroes, N.Y. POST, Sept. 14, 2006, at 10, also
2006 WLNR 15958803 (study by Montefiore Medical Center shows that firefighters at Ground Zero lost 12
years of lung function).
246
An academic assessment of the long-term effects of worker exposure to 9/11 debris is reported
in WTC Workers Report Acute Health Problems, 64 Occupational Hazards 40, Oct. 1, 2002, available at
243
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granted to phone technicians at a future Ground Zero.247 But after 9/11, courts would
probably rule that the services of emergency doctors and nurses are so vital as to fall
within the doctrine of trinoda necessitas. Since there is precedent for enjoining a national
emergency work stoppage at one factory,248 even a single site would be subject to
national emergency orders. Time would be critical in ordering these workers back on the
job, but Taft-Hartley injunctions can be speedily ordered.249
Conclusion No. 4: Unless new legislation bolsters legal protections against
involuntarily servitude, the regulation of compulsory labor will be determined by courts
in the heat of an economic crisis. To address this alarming prospect,250 I suggest that the
best policy option is to amend the Taft-Hartley Act. Congress can divest federal courts of
jurisdiction to enjoin national emergency work stoppages that stem from “terrorism” or a
“major disaster.” Elsewhere, Congress has defined these terms with great specificity.251

2002 WL 11200763. Researchers at Johns Hopkins University are surprised to find persistent symptoms
among truckers and crane operators who worked at Ground Zero inside climate-controlled cabs. Id.
Researchers conclude that these “inside workers” probably had less exposure to air contaminants than
ironworkers, who were not in the study group but labored in the open to clear the twisted wreckage of the
buildings. Id.
247
See Shawn Young et al., Verizon Says NYSE’s Phone System Is Up and Running, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 17, 2001, at B5 (stating that more than 2,000 service technicians were deployed in and around Ground
Zero to undertake massive emergency rebuilding of lower Manhattan’s phone system).
248
U.S. v. Am. Locomotive Co., 109 F.Supp. 78 (W.D.N.Y. 1952). The court issued a national
emergency injunction for a single factory in Dunkirk, New York. The facility was the exclusive
manufacturing site for piping and heat exchanges that were essential in making atomic weapons.
249
See U.S. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 202 F.2d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 1953), where the court
hastily granted an ex parte restraining order under Taft-Hartley that was based solely on the president’s
board of inquiry findings. More generally, see Robert Dishman, The Public Interest in Emergency Labor
Disputes, 45 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1100, 1109 (1951) (observing that “(i)n a number of disputes, the board of
inquiry has been forced to hurry its investigation in order to report to the President in time for him to
prevent the strike or have it called off at the earliest practicable moment”).
250
See Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ dissent in Northern Sec. Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197, 364
(1904), stating: “Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason
of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment.”
251
Pub.L. 107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002), 116 Stat. 2135, Homeland Security Act of 2002, codified at 6
U.S.C.A. § 101 (2006). Section 101(11) defines “major disaster” by reference to 42 U.S.C.A. § 5122(2),
which states:
any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven
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This policy change would not interfere with the normal operation of Taft-Hartley, which
pertains to strikes and lockouts that result from bargaining impasses. Moreover, when
Taft-Hartley was enacted, Congress also intended to protect workers from abnormally
dangerous working conditions.252 While enacting this limit on courts, Congress should
amend the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 to permit U.S. military forces to substitute for
civilian workers during these extreme national emergencies.253
The federal government has powerful tools to force recalcitrant workers back on
the job in a national emergency. These instruments, some of which lay dormant, can be
readily adapted to the next national emergency that presents a work-stoppage crisis. But
my research shows that emergency courts rarely side with the individual who stands in
the way of the public’s welfare. Without a labor policy to address emerging national
crises, America may belatedly realize “that when we allow fundamental freedoms to be
sacrificed in the name of real or perceived emergency, we invariably come to regret it.”254

water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide,
snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part
of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance . . . to supplement
the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief
organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.
Section 101(15) defines “terrorism” as
any activity that—
(A) involves an act that—
(i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical
infrastructure or key resources; and
(ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State or other subdivision of the United States; and
(B) appears to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping.
252
See supra notes 50 - 53.
253
See supra note 241.
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Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (J. Brennan,
dissenting).

